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IT'S ALL ABOUT THE PRINCIPAL:
PRESERVING CONSUMERS' RIGHT OF
RESCISSION UNDER THE TRUTH IN LENDING
ACT*
LEA KRIVINSKAS SHEPARD"
This Article explores a significant market-based threat to the Truth
in Lending Act's ("TILA") right of rescission, a remedy that
attempts to deter lender overreaching and fraud during one of the
most complex financial transactions of a consumer's lifetime. The
depressed housing market has substantially impaired many
borrowers' ability to fulfill their responsibilities in rescission's
unwinding process: restoring the lender to the status quo ante by
repaying the net loan proceeds of the mortgage transaction.
When a consumer is unable to finance her tender obligation, non-
bankruptcy judges' overwhelming response has been to protect the
lender and deny rescission to the borrower. This Article argues that
these courts, to fulfill TILA's consumer-protective function, must
take a different approach. Courts should use their equitable
authority under TILA to modify borrowers' repayment obligations
by allowing borrowers to tender in installments, over a period of
years, and at reasonable interest rates. This approach both averts
foreclosures that harm borrowers, lenders, and neighborhoods and
ensures that TILA's consumer-protective mandate will remain
viable even in a depressed housing market.
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This Article also considers an important aspect of TILA's rescission
remedy that, while tacitly acknowledged by courts and
commentators, has been insufficiently explored in the academic
literature. There exists an uneasy tension between the goal of
TILA-informing consumers of the financial consequences of their
mortgage loan transactions-and borrowers' frequent use of TILA
rescission: defending their homes from foreclosure actions that the
lender's disclosure violation may or may not have precipitated. The
Article concludes that TILA's rescission provisions, albeit a blunt
instrument in the consumer protection setting, must be vigorously
enforced, particularly during periods of economic calamity, since
the statute remains a singular source of borrower leverage in a legal
and economic climate that remains generally inhospitable to
homeowners.
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INTRODUCTION: UNDERWATER AND DROWNING
The Paxtins were in trouble. They knew it, and their creditors
knew it. Two months behind on their mortgage payments and credit
card bills, the couple, tired of dunning calls from debt collectors,
cringed every time the phone rang, which seemed like every hour.
They knew they might lose their home.
In the real estate section at the local Barnes & Noble, the couple
learned about various "foreclosure defense" strategies.' Bankruptcy
could help the couple reduce their credit card debt2 but would not
provide a long-term solution for their mortgage debt, which had
grown out of control.' The Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"),4 however,
1. See generally, e.g., RALPH R. ROBERTS & Lois MAuAK, FORECLOSURE SELF-
DEFENSE FOR DUMMIES (2008) (describing numerous defensive actions for a consumer
facing foreclosure).
2. In either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a consumer may discharge a
sizeable portion of her unsecured debt. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1328(a) (2006); Dalie
Jimenez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 795, 805-06 (2009) (demonstrating in a study of 2,500 Chapter 7 cases filed
between 2007 and 2009 that only eleven percent of all general unsecured claims received
any distribution whatsoever; of these, the average median distribution was eight percent);
Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge
and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 430 (1999)
(demonstrating in a late 1990s sample that unsecured creditors received only 15.2% of
their claims in Chapter 13 plans).
3. Consumers may modify various debts in Chapter 13 bankruptcy by reducing
interest rates, extending loan terms, changing amortization schedules, and limiting secured
claims to the value of the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006). The Bankruptcy
Code, however, prevents borrowers from modifying mortgage loans secured only by the
debtor's principal residence. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2); Adam Levitin, Resolving the
Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571
(explaining that the bankruptcy system is generally unable to help reduce the damage
from the current foreclosure crisis because of the protection it provides to most lenders
who hold residential mortgage claims). Instead, borrowers must cure defaults on
residential loans and pay off the loans according to their original terms; otherwise, the
bankruptcy court will lift the stay on collection actions and allow the mortgagee to
foreclose on the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5);
Levitin, supra, at 582.
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might help resolve the couple's dilemma. Under TILA-an expansive
federal credit price disclosure statute-if their lender made a
"material" error6 in the paperwork it provided the couple two and a
half years ago when they refinanced into their thirty-year, eight
percent variable interest rate loan, the couple might find a way out of
the morass. If, for example, their lender misstated the annual
percentage rate ("APR")' or finance charge,' or failed to inform the
couple of their right to back out of the loan at no cost within the first
three days after closing,9 the Paxtins might be able to rescind-or
cancel-the loan. 10
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2006).
5. See generally DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT
AND THE LAW § 14:17, at 1022-24 (2008-2009 ed.) [hereinafter PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN,
CONSUMER CREDIT] (providing an overview of the right of rescission).
6. TILA defines "material disclosures" as
the annual percentage rate, the method of determining the finance charge and the
balance upon which a finance charge will be imposed, the amount of the finance
charge, the amount to be financed, the total of payments, the number and amount
of payments, and the due dates or periods of payments scheduled to repay the
indebtedness.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (2006).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006). The APR provides a "unitary shopping instrument"
by converting the finance charge into a percentage rate based on an annual term.
Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but
the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 188 (2008).
8. TILA defines the finance charge as "the sum of all charges, payable directly or
indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly
by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006). The
finance charge includes, for example, interest, service charges, loan fees, credit report fees,
and insurance charges. Id.
9. Under TILA, each borrower having a right to rescind must receive two copies of
the notice of right to rescind, which must clearly (1) disclose that the creditor is retaining
or acquiring a security interest in the consumer's principal dwelling, (2) disclose that the
consumer has a right to rescind the transaction, (3) describe how the consumer can
exercise the right to rescind, (4) describe the effects of rescission, and (5) provide the date
the rescission period expires. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(b), .23(b) (2010). The Federal Reserve
Board has published model disclosure forms, including a model notice of right to rescind,
to assist creditors in complying with the disclosure requirements. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R pt. 226
app. H-8 (refinancing with a new lender); id. at app. H-9 (refinancing with the same
creditor that issued the original loan). The requirement that each obligor receive two
copies of the notice of right to rescind "is not a mere technicality," as "[e]ffective exercise
of the right to rescind obviously depends upon the delivery of one copy of the rescission
form to the creditor and the retention by the obligor of the other copy." Stone v.
Mehlberg, 728 F. Supp. 1341, 1353 (W.D. Mich. 1989). Moreover, "each person whose
home ownership interest may be compromised by a credit transaction must be informed of
his or her rescission rights." Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006).
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Alternatively, if the couple had a good attorney, they might be
able to reach a settlement with the lender (or the lender's assignee").
If confronted with a solid TILA rescission claim, the lender,
concerned about the possibility of protracted litigation, might agree
to modify the couple's loan by reducing the interest rate, principal, or
both. In the best-case scenario, the foreclosure action would be
dismissed and the Paxtins could keep their home. The couple wasn't
sure if the lender had made any errors substantial enough to trigger
their rescission rights, but they had noticed that they were paying for
credit insurance that they didn't remember learning about. As they
dug out their mortgage paperwork from a filing cabinet, they noticed
that they had received four copies of a "Notice of Right to Cancel,"2
but the date field had been left blank.
TILA errors seemed surprisingly common, particularly during
the early years of the mortgage bubble.13 Although mortgage
companies' compliance departments are supposed to scrutinize
mortgage loan documents for mistakes and omissions,14 lenders
commit TILA errors more often than they violate any other
consumer protection regulation.'" Some companies in the business of
identifying actionable mistakes in borrowers' disclosure documents
claim that major TILA or related violations might be spotted in as
many as eighty percent of loans.'6
11. Although this Article generally refers to those who oppose TILA rescission claims
as "lenders" or "creditors," any rescission action can also be brought against assignees, 15
U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2006), even though "assignees" are not "creditors" under TILA. 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17) (2010) (a creditor must be the person "to whom the obligation is
initially payable"); see also FDIC v. Hughes Dev. Co., 684 F. Supp. 616, 622-23 (D. Minn.
1988) (holding that when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") purchases
assets secured by mortgages on consumers' principal dwellings, the FDIC remains subject
to the consumers' rescission rights); ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 2.3.5.2, at 28-30 (6th ed. 2007) ("Even
when it is clear that an assignee does not meet the [TILA] definition of creditor, the
assignee is liable for [TILA] violations in a number of circumstances.").
12. See supra note 9.
13. Telephone Interview with Pamela Simmons, Partner, Law Office of Simmons &
Purdy (Feb. 9, 2010) (describing the high frequency of material disclosure errors she
observed in 2004-2006).
14. See, e.g., FIS REGULATORY SERVICES, FIS REGULATORY SERVICES MANUAL §§
2.204, 2.244, 2.245 (2010), available at 2010 WL 1872958 (compliance manual used by
residential lenders to help lenders fulfill state and federal regulatory requirements).
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Yen, Current Truth in Lending Issues, 53 CONSUMER FIN. L.
Q. REP. 25, 26 n.12 (1999) (according to 1996 FDIC report, FDIC cited banks most often
for TILA violations).
16. Gretchen Morgenson, The Silence of the Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at B1
(quoting the statements of a forensic loan audit company's president that TILA, Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), and other errors were found in at least
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If, however, the lender was unwilling to settle, a court would
have to determine whether or not the couple was entitled to rescind.
If the court identified a material error, the lender and the Paxtins
would, through rescission, unwind the transaction, returning the
parties to the status quo ante-their pre-mortgage transaction
positions." The lender would have to return to the Paxtins their
closing costs' 8 and two and a half years' worth of finance charges,
including interest.19 In turn, the Paxtins would be required to return
the present balance on the mortgage-the loan principal.20 The net
sum they would have to return to the lender (the current balance
minus the closing costs and finance charges the lender would be
forced to return) 2 1-the couple's "tender obligation" or the "net loan
proceeds"-would be several thousand dollars less than the principal
balance on the couple's mortgage.2 2 Rescission is so costly for and
intimidating to creditors precisely because successful rescission
plaintiffs receive the equivalent of an interest-free, fee-free mortgage
for the period between the loan closing and the exercise of their
rescission rights.
eighty percent of mortgages recently reviewed); Lew Sichelman, Document Review Could
Save Home, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2008, at 8 (quoting a forensic loan auditor's statement that
eighty percent of recent mortgages audited had errors relating to TILA, RESPA,
predatory lending, and fraud); Linda Stern, Step Carefully When You Enter the Mortgage
Market: The Problems Abound, Bos. GLOBE, July 30, 2009, at B10 ("Almost every
mortgage made during the big bubble has missing paperwork or other mistakes that
violate the Truth in Lending Act."). Estimates of the frequency of actionable TILA errors,
however, vary widely.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2006); e.g., McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.,
475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Rescission essentially restores the status quo ante; the
creditor terminates its security interest and returns any monies paid by the debtor in
exchange for the latter's return of all disbursed funds or property interests."); Sosa v. Fite,
498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[Sjection 1635(b) is clearly designed to restore the
parties as much as possible to the status quo ante.").
18. For example, the lender must return all broker fees, application and commitment
fees, and title search and appraisal fees. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 supp. I (2010); 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.15(d)(2) cmt. 1 (2010); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2) cmt. 1 (2010).
19. 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(d)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(d)(2) cmts. 1-2; 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.23(d)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2) cmts. 1-2; 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 supp. I.
20. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(d)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(3).
21. To prevent an inefficient and "perfunctory" exchange of funds, courts routinely
allow the creditor to offset the interest and fees it must return to the borrower against the
loan principal the borrower must tender to the lender. See Harris v. Tower Loan of Miss.,
Inc., 609 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Piercy, 18 B.R. 1004, 1008 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1982).
22. See Stuart v. Decision One Mortg. Co. (In re Stuart), 367 B.R. 541, 552 n.12
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (providing detailed description of how a successful rescission
reduces the borrower's overall liability to her lender).
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The only problem was that the Paxtins weren't sure how they
were going to fulfill their end of the rescission bargain, or "tender" 23
the net loan proceeds to the lender. In a more normal housing
market, to unwind a mortgage through rescission, the Paxtins could
either finance the tender obligation by refinancing their mortgage or
by selling their home, using the proceeds of either the refinancing or
the sale to pay off the mortgage written by the TILA-violating
lender.24 If the couple successfully refinanced their mortgage,
generating sufficient proceeds to pay the tender obligation, the couple
could avert foreclosure and remain in their home. Even if the Paxtins
were insufficiently creditworthy to refinance the loan, they could
finance their tender obligation by selling the home, allowing the
couple to satisfy a major debt burden and move on to a more
affordable apartment or smaller home.
The Paxtins couldn't refinance their mortgage or sell their home,
however, because they, like nearly a quarter of American
21 ,homeowners, were "underwater," or "upside down," on their
mortgage: they owed more on their mortgage than their home-the
collateral securing their mortgage loan-was worth.26 In a depressed
23. In the contracts setting, the phrase "tender of performance" refers to an "obligor's
demonstration of readiness, willingness, and ability to perform the obligation." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (9th ed. 2009). Under this definition, a borrower seeking to
rescind a loan transaction would "tender" by offering to return the net loan proceeds to
the lender and, at the time of the offer, be capable of performing. See id. In the TILA
context, however, courts use the word "tender" very loosely. Courts sometimes refer to a
borrower's "tender of performance," and, at other times, courts describe "tender" as the
borrower's actual performance of the obligation (i.e., the rescinding borrower's actual
payment of the net loan proceeds to the lender). This confusion is partially attributable to
courts' diverse approaches to structuring the parties' obligations in the unwinding process.
See infra Part II.
24. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 6.8.2, at 465.
25. Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, 1 in 4 Borrowers Under Water, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 2009, at Al. By the end of 2010, nearly forty-two percent of Americans may be
underwater. Dawn Kopecki & Theo Francis, U.S. May Retool Loan Program for
Underwater Borrowers, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXET2rl66YGU.
26. Various terms describe the condition of a borrower, her mortgage, and the owner
of the mortgage note (either the original lender or an assignee) when the borrower's
mortgage exceeds her home's value. Such a borrower may be "under water," MARK M.
ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 3600 LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION,
AND HOW TO AVOID THE NExT FINANCIAL CRISIS 40 (2009), or "upside down,"
MAUREEN BURTON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONS 326 (2d ed. 2010), on her mortgage. Or, she may have "negative equity"
(the amount by which the mortgage debt exceeds the home's value) in her home. SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 17 (2010),
available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2010/Factors Affecting-Implementation
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or unstable housing market, no private lender would be likely to
refinance a loan with more than a 100% loan-to-value ratio,27 since, in
the event the borrower defaulted on the mortgage and the lender
forced a sale of the home, the lender would be left with a large
deficiency.28 Likewise, if the couple attempted to finance their tender
obligation by selling their home, they would be left short: a sale of the
home in the current depressed housing market would yield far less
than the couple owed on the mortgage. Thus, a sale could not
generate enough proceeds to fully repay the net loan proceeds.
Things seemed bleak for the Paxtins. After the couple notified
their lender that they intended to rescind the mortgage transaction,
the lender initially ignored the rescission notice.29 A few weeks later,
it sent the couple a letter denying any TILA violations. Shortly after
the parties brought the matter to court, the lender filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming that, even if the lender had failed to disclose
material information under TILA, thereby entitling the borrowers to
rescission, continuing with the case would be futile. According to the
lender, since the borrowers were underwater, they were unable to
tender and, thus, unable to fulfill their end of the rescission "bargain."
Without examining the merits of the borrowers' claim, the court
gave the Paxtins an ultimatum: unless they tendered within sixty days,
oftheHomeAffordable_.Modification Program.pdf. A creditor holding such a
mortgage is referred to as "undersecured." CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY § 7.32, at 772 (2d ed. 2009). Such mortgages have a loan-to-value ratio
greater than 100%. See BURTON ET AL., supra, at 327-28.
27. The loan-to-value ratio, a key factor in lenders' financing decisions, is calculated
by dividing the outstanding principal by the current value of the property subject to the
lender's security interest. JACK P. FRIEDMAN & JACK C. HARRIS, KEYS TO MORTGAGE
FINANCING AND REFINANCING 12 (2007).
28. DIANE THOMPSON & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
TRUTH IN LENDING § 6.8.2, at 293 (6th ed. Supp. 2009) ("Planning for tender may be
more complicated ... when the borrower owes more than the home is worth. This may, for
example, make refinancing impossible unless the excess debt is reduced through other
claims."); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A
SOLUTION 34 (2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-030609-report.pdf.
If a borrower is underwater, a private lender is unlikely to refinance the loan because the
borrower's "repayment incentives are diminished and the homeowner may abandon the
property due to the negative equity overhang." Id. For example, a borrower who
experiences substantial financial distress, desires to relocate to a new job in a distant
location, or wants to downsize to a smaller home may conclude that the simplest course of
action is to walk away from a home with significant negative equity that is impossible to
sell. Id.
29. It is common for creditors to ignore borrowers' rescission notices. See, e.g., Prince
v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 08-00574-KD-N, 2009 WL 2998141, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 14,
2009).
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it would dismiss their rescission claim.30 Because the couple was
underwater, no lender would agree to a refinancing, and a sale of the
home couldn't cover the entire tender obligation. Because the couple
couldn't tender, the court dismissed the action with prejudice. Out of
options, the couple vacated the property. Marked by a "bank-owned"
placard in the yard, the home stands dormant on a quiet street.
TILA has a laudable goal-clearly and conspicuously disclosing
to consumers the cost of various credit transactions, thereby
protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive acts and practices
and increasing competition among banks and financial institutions.3 1
Consistent with this goal, under TILA, a consumer who has taken out
a non-purchase-money mortgage 32-through a home refinancing,
home equity loan, or home improvement credit sale 33-has an
absolute right to rescind the loan within three business days following
the loan closing.' This three-day "cooling off"" or "buyer's
remorse"36 period can extend to up to three years, however, if the
lender omits or incorrectly discloses certain material information 37 in
the documents the borrowers received during a non-purchase-money
mortgage loan transaction.
Lenders pay dearly for these errors: as part of the unwinding
process, lenders must return to borrowers all closing costs, finance
charges (including interest), and all payments that the borrower has
made to the lender between the loan closing and the exercise of her
rescission rights. In turn, the borrower must return to the lender the
original loan proceeds.
30. For a description of cases in which courts routinely dismiss inability-to-tender
actions before adjudicating borrowers' rescission claims, see infra Part II.A.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
32. A non-purchase-money mortgage is a mortgage other than one used to finance the
initial construction or acquisition of a property. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2006) (defining a
"residential mortgage transaction"). Only non-purchase-money mortgages are eligible for
rescission. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1) (2006) (excepting from TILA's rescission provisions
"residential mortgage transactions," or purchase-money mortgages). Congress presumably
was not concerned with providing borrowers a right of rescission in the purchase-money
context, since, in such cases, it would likely be apparent to the borrower that the home
would be encumbered by the new mortgage.
33. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 5, § 14:18, at 1024,
1026.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
35. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 5, § 14:17, at 1022.
36. Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1986).
37. See supra note 6.
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The results of a successful rescission action can be dramatic. The
net sum the borrower must return to the lender to terminate the
parties' relationship can be thousands of dollars-up to three years'
worth of fees and interest-less than the borrower's current mortgage
obligation. Through bringing a rescission action, borrowers can
routinely reduce their principal balance by ten to twenty percent, a
result far more advantageous to the borrower than that achievable
through any private or government-sponsored loan modification. In
anticipation of protracted litigation and this costly result, lenders have
been known to settle with borrowers who bring strong rescission
claims.38 In these settlements, lenders might agree to modify a
borrower's mortgage loan by reducing the current balance by roughly
the same amount the lender would have to return to the borrower in
a rescission-a figure equal to the fees and interest that have
accumulated since the loan closing.
Through either a completed rescission or a loan modification, the
borrower, in the best case scenario, can come out ahead. A borrower
previously behind on her mortgage payments might be able to avert
foreclosure, remain in her home, and resume payments on a smaller
mortgage loan.
TILA's rescission remedy, exercisable by borrowers on a strict
liability basis,39 serves a significant role in preventing lender
overreaching during one of the most complex and important financial
transactions in the life of a borrower. TILA rescission actions,
likewise, provide one of the few sources of borrower leverage in
negotiations with lenders for home mortgage modifications.'
As illustrated by the Paxtins' story, however, TILA's rescission
remedy is currently out of reach for a sizable group of consumers in
certain areas of the country where home values have dropped
considerably between the time the borrowers entered into these
mortgage transactions with TILA-violating lenders and the point at
38. E-mail from Pamela Simmons, Partner, Law Office of Simmons & Purdy, to
author (Oct. 2, 2010) (on file with author) (noting that lenders, in general, have long
routinely settled valid rescission claims, but observing that, in the current legal and
economic environment, lenders appear less willing to negotiate with borrowers).
39. See, e.g., Household Fin. Realty Corp. v. McElvany (In re McElvany), 98 B.R. 237,
240 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) ("It is a system of strict liability if the required disclosures are
not made according to provisions of Regulation Z. It is strict liability in the sense that
absolute compliance is required and even technical violations will form the basis for
liability.") (citations omitted); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.4.2.3.2, at 13
("Except where Congress has explicitly relieved lenders of liability for noncompliance, it is
a strict liability statute.").
40. See infra Part III.C.
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which the borrowers seek rescission.41 In more normal housing
markets, a borrower who is eligible for rescission may be able to
tender even if the value of her home is slightly less than the principal
balance of her mortgage-if she is only minimally underwater,42 since
the borrower's obligation is reduced by all origination fees and
finance charges paid between the loan closing and the time of the
loan's cancellation.43 In the current housing market, however, while a
rescinding borrower must tender only the loan principal minus all
finance charges and closing costs reaped by the TILA-violating
lender," as a result of recent dramatic decreases in home values in
certain areas of the country,45 many borrowers' net tender obligations
are still likely to exceed the value of their homes.4 6 Thus, an
underwater TILA plaintiff typically cannot refinance her mortgage,4 7
and the sale of her home usually cannot generate sufficient proceeds
to fully finance the borrower's tender obligation.
When a consumer is unable to finance her tender obligation,
non-bankruptcy judges' overwhelming response is to use their
equitable authority under TILA to protect the lender. Concerned that
an underwater TILA plaintiff will be unable to fulfill her end of the
rescission "bargain," judges frequently dismiss the plaintiff's
rescission action altogether. As a result, TILA's rescission remedy, a
powerful means of reducing lender overreaching, is at risk of
becoming dormant and underutilized in the current depressed
housing market. In the words of two practicing lawyers, TILA, at
least in the rescission context, is a "statute without a remedy." 48 As a
result, many lawyers in communities hardest-hit by depressed real
41. Simon & Hagerty, supra note 25; Kopecki & Francis, supra note 25.
42. See supra note 26 (definition of "underwater").
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006). For example, if a borrower is only a few thousand
dollars underwater, this "negative equity" might be canceled out by the interest and fees
the lender must return to the borrower as part of the rescission process. See id.
44. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2010).
45. According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, the U.S. housing market
experienced record declines beginning in 2007. See Press Release, Standard & Poor's,
Nationally, Home Prices Began 2009 with Record Declines According to the S&P/Case-
Shiller Home Price Indices (May 26, 2009), available at http://www2.standardand
poors.com/spf/pdflindex/CSHomePriceRelease_- 052619.pdf.
46. Simon & Hagerty, supra note 25; Kopecki & Francis, supra note 25.
47. See THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 28, § 6.8.2, at 293.
48. Telephone Interview with Dan Mulligan, Principal, Jenkins Mulligan & Gabriel
LLP (Jan. 25, 2010); Telephone Interview with Pamela Simmons, supra note 13.
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estate prices are turning away clients with valid TILA rescission
claims, regardless of the strength of the lawsuit.49
Non-bankruptcy courts' dominant approach in inability-to-
tender cases is too rigid. By requiring consumers to repay their tender
obligations in full and immediately or risk dismissal of their claims,
courts are, in effect, limiting rescission to a decreasing pool of
privileged homeowners: those who can afford to tender from
available funds or those with sufficient equity in their homes to
finance their tender obligations. Given the recent widespread collapse
in home values, this approach is impracticable and inequitable.
There is a better way. This Article argues that these courts, to
fulfill TILA's consumer-protective function, should take a different
approach. Non-bankruptcy courts, which handle the vast majority of
TILA rescission actions,"o should use their equitable authority under
TILA to modify borrowers' repayment obligations by allowing
borrowers to tender in installments, over a period of years, and at
reasonable interest rates. There are significant benefits for all
stakeholders-borrowers, lenders, and communities alike-associated
with modifying repayment obligations. Considering the difficulty
many government-sponsored and private-party loan modification
programs have had in gaining traction to avert further degradation of
the housing market," rescission-based modifications of repayment
obligations can help mitigate the damage from the current housing
crisis. This approach both reduces foreclosures that harm borrowers,
lenders, and communities5 2 and ensures that TILA's consumer-
49. Telephone Interview with Dan Mulligan, supra note 48; Telephone Interview with
Pamela Simmons, supra note 13.
50. Telephone Interview with David P. Leibowitz, Managing Member and Partner,
Lakelaw (Jan. 29, 2010). Most TILA rescission actions appear to be brought in state court
in response to foreclosure actions. Id. Most bankruptcy attorneys, moreover, are
unfamiliar with the Truth in Lending Act and rarely bring actions under consumer statutes
like TILA. Id.
51. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-837, TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: TREASURY ACTIONS NEEDED TO MAKE THE HOME
AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM MORE TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE 47
(2009); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, EVALUATING PROGRESS ON TARP FORECLOSURE
MITIGATION PROGRAMS 3-5 (2010), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
041410-report.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, Treasury Weighs Fixes to a Program to Fend off
Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at B1.
52. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 28, at 8-10 (describing how
foreclosures impose significant stress and losses on households, communities, state and
local governments, and investors). One study estimated that each foreclosure on average
imposes $60,000 in direct costs on lenders; another study estimated that one foreclosure
can depress the property values of the eighty closest homes by nearly $5,000. Id.
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protective mandate will remain viable even in a depressed housing
market.
Part I of this Article describes the origins of TILA and how
courts, through the practice of conditional rescission, have used their
equitable authority under TILA and Regulation Z, TILA's
implementing regulation,53 to protect lenders' interests. Part II
describes how the depressed housing market prevents many rescission
plaintiffs from restoring creditors to the status quo ante in full and
immediately, and explores several non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy
court cases in which courts have confronted inability-to-tender
problems. Part III critiques courts' variegated but predominant
practice of denying rescission relief-and TILA's protections-to
borrowers who cannot afford to immediately tender in full. This Part
suggests that these courts should instead allow borrowers to tender in
installments, an approach that is more consistent with TILA's
consumer-protective mandate and is crucial in preserving borrowers'
leverage in a predominantly inhospitable legal and economic climate.
Whether or not disclosure-based regulations are the most
effective means of protecting consumers in the marketplace is a
fundamental question, but one beyond the scope of this Article.
Important perspectives on this topic have been discussed elsewhere.54
This Article, in contrast, takes a pragmatic view of how courts and
regulators can currently fashion the contours of TILA's rescission
remedy in a way most consistent with TILA's consumer-protective
origins and functions, and to an extent that can help alleviate
insidious problems in the housing market. While meaningful,
53. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2010). In Regulation Z, the Federal Reserve Board promulgates
comprehensive rules interpreting TILA. For a discussion of the history of Regulation Z
and the Federal Reserve Board's interpretations, see RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11,
§ 1.4.3.1, at 13-14.
54. At the moment, consumer credit regulation is dominated by disclosure laws. Many
commentators, however, have expressed doubt that disclosure-based regulation can
effectively inform consumers and, accordingly, affect behavior. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill &
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28, 42 (2008) (describing
studies concluding that consumers misunderstand mortgage and credit card disclosures);
Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26
UCLA L. REV. 711, 715 (1979) ("Behavioral scientists, public opinion research, consumer
research, and our own common sense tell us the same thing: consumer behavior in a
particular transaction is almost certainly not going to be affected by a [Truth in Lending]
disclosure statement, notwithstanding the quality of that statement."); Patricia A. McCoy,
Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV J. ON LEGIS. 123, 123
(2007); Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection
Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1531781.
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substantive reform of the consumer protection landscape is critical,
change remains elusive. This Article emphasizes that courts currently
have the ability-through use of their equitable authority-to
alleviate homeowner suffering and to ensure that TILA's goals are
realized to the extent possible given current political and economic
realities.
I. THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: A POWERFUL AND
CONTROVERSIAL DISCLOSURE STATUTE
A. Why Congress Passed TILA
A product of President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society"
initiatives," TILA's enactment in 1968 "marked the birth of modern
consumer legislative activism."5 6 Its complex disclosures and frequent
use by consumers have long unnerved the credit industry," and the
statute remains "the most intricate and controversial mandatory
disclosure law ever enacted."" When Congress passed TILA, the
consumer protection landscape was vastly different from its current
state. TILA's passage, for example, preceded a protracted period of
deregulation and federal preemption of state consumer laws.59 While
the statute remains a powerful enforcement tool, the consumer-
centric sentiments that saturate TILA are vestiges of a more
consumer-protective and paternalistic legal and economic culture.
Congress passed TILA primarily to address ubiquitous defects in
creditors' cost-of-credit disclosures. 60 Before TILA, consumers found
55. See Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, Remarks at the University
of Michigan (May 22, 1964), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON: 1963-64, at 704-07 (discussing poverty, urban decay, the
erosion of community bonds, environmental dangers, and inadequate education);
ROBERT DALLEK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT 227-50 (2005);
Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the
Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1710-18 (1993).
56. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.2.1, at 4.
57. Id. § 1.2.1, at 4-5.
58. JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 125 (3d ed.
2007).
59. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT:
REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 3.1.1, at 41-43 (3d ed. 2005).
Interest rate deregulation, for example, arrived in the late 1970s and early 1980s, triggered
by inflationary pressure that reduced lenders' profits, raising concerns that usury laws'
caps on interest rates would result in decreased lending. Id.
60. Landers & Rohner, supra note 54, at 713 ("The basic premises of TIL[A] were
that consumers needed certain information to make essential decisions in consumer credit
transactions and that the information then available as part of the contracting process, or
provided as a result of state law requirements, was inadequate.").
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it difficult or impossible to comparison shop for credit, since creditors
had no uniform way of calculating interest or determining what
additional charges would be included in the interest rate.6 1 To remedy
this problem, TILA requires lenders to disclose to prospective
consumer borrowers specific, standardized information about open-62
and closed-end6 credit transactions in an attempt to both (1) increase
transparency and competition in the credit markets and (2) promote
the "informed use of credit."' TILA provides a standardized
definition of two key measurements of the cost of credit: the finance
charge65 and the APR.'
TILA's application is broad-ranging from open-end 6' credit
transactions like credit card and home equity loans to closed-end 68
transactions like car loans and mortgages. The statute applies
whenever a creditor6 1 offers or extends credit to a consumer"
61. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.1.1, at 1. For example, lenders calculated
interest in a variety of ways, including the add-on rate, the discount rate, and a simple
interest rate, making it very difficult for a consumer to choose the cheapest form of credit.
Id.; Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 875-76 (2003).
62. An open-end credit transaction is one in which (1) the creditor reasonably
contemplates repeated transactions, (2) the creditor may impose a finance charge on an
outstanding unpaid balance, and (3) the amount of credit that is extended to the consumer
up to a particular limit is generally made available to the extent that the consumer repays
the outstanding balance. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (2010). Examples of open-end credit
arrangements include credit card loans and home equity loans. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5-.16
(2010) (disclosure regulations for open-end credit transactions). See generally PRIDGEN &
ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 5, § 8:2, at 503-09 (defining open-end
credit).
63. Regulation Z defines "closed-end credit" negatively: as consumer credit other
than open-end credit. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10); see 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17-.24 (2010)
(discussing disclosure regulations for closed-end credit transactions).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006). Regulation Z describes the finance charge as "the
cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount." 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2010). It "includes
charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by
the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit." Id. The finance
charge includes, for example, interest, service charges, loan fees, credit report fees, and
insurance charges. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006); Renuart & Thompson, supra note 7, at 188.
67. See supra note 62.
68. See supra note 63.
69. Regulation Z defines a "creditor" as a person (1) "who regularly extends
consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in
more than 4 installments" and (2) "to whom the obligation is initially payable." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.2(a)(17) (2010). Any person who originates two or more mortgages over the course
of a year or who originates one or more mortgages through a mortgage broker is
considered a creditor subject to TILA's rescission provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (2006);
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17). Although assignees are not "creditors" under TILA, assignees
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes," and when the
credit is subject to a finance charge72 or is payable by a written
agreement in more than four installments." Congress delegated broad
authority to the Federal Reserve Board to implement TILA,74 and the
Board has exercised this authority by issuing Regulation Z75 and an
Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z.76 The Board's
interpretations of TILA and Regulation Z are given great deference
by courts.77
For certain TILA violations, a creditor is liable for actual
damages, statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees.
If, however, lenders commit material disclosure violations in non-
purchase-money79 home equity credit transactions, borrowers can also
pursue a more dramatic remedy." If, as part of the transaction, the
creditor acquired or retained a non-purchase-money security interest
in the consumer's principal dwelling, the consumer can rescind the
transaction until midnight of the third business day following the loan
closing.s' During this three-day "cooling-off" period, a consumer is
"to reflect on the wisdom and desirability of the contract and on the
risk of possible loss of the home."8 2 Congress believed that by
imposing a "mandatory period for reflection and evaluation,
consumers would be less susceptible to high-pressure or fraudulent
creditor practices [that] resulted in an encumbrance on and possible
nonetheless are subject to rescission. See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2006); e.g., FDIC v. Hughes
Dev. Co., 684 F. Supp. 616, 622-23 (D. Minn. 1988).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(11) (defining "consumer").
71. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12) (defining "consumer credit").
72. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2010) (defining "finance charge").
73. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c)(1) (2010) (describing TILA's coverage).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006).
75. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.58 (2010).
76. 12 C.F.R. § 226; 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 supp. 1 (2010).
77. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) (holding that
Federal Reserve Board staff opinions interpreting TILA and Regulation Z are dispositive
"[ulnless demonstrably irrational").
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006).
79. For a description of non-purchase-money mortgages, see sources cited supra note
32.
80. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.1.2, at 3.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1), (3) (2006). Only non-
purchase-money mortgages are eligible for rescission. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1)
(excepting from TILA's rescission provisions "residential mortgage transaction[s],"
defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2006) as financing agreements arising from the
"acquisition or initial construction" of a home).
82. RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 1 8.01[1], at 598
(Robert A. Cook et al. eds., 2000).
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loss of the homestead."83 The consumer's three-day rescission right
extends to three years' if the creditor fails to provide the consumer
with a notice describing the rescission right or with material
information about the loan, including the APR, finance charge,
amount financed, total of payments, and payment schedule."
TILA has undergone several substantial revisions during its
thirty-year history. In response to criticism from creditors that
compliance with the earliest version of the statute had become too
difficult, TILA was amended in 1980 in the Truth in Lending
Simplification and Reform Act.86 In 1994, in response to the
predatory lending crisis," Congress passed the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") as an amendment to TILA."
HOEPA established enhanced disclosure rules for "high cost" home
mortgages exceeding certain price threshold triggers.8 9 In 1995, in
response to Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Company,0 a controversial class
action in which the Eleventh Circuit identified relatively minor
disclosure errors as TILA violations triggering rescission,91 Congress
clarified what charges needed to be incorporated in the finance
charge and broadened TILA's definition of an "accurate" finance
charge.' In July 2008, in response to the subprime mortgage crisis,
83. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (2006).
86. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168
(1980) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Based on claims that well-intentioned
creditors were having difficulty complying with TILA's technicalities, the Simplification
Act reduced the number of required TILA disclosures and limited creditors' liability to
"significant" violations. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.2.2, at 5-7.
87. ROBERT J. HOBBS & STEPHEN GARDNER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE
PRACTICE OF CONSUMER LAW: SEEKING ECONOMIC JUSTICE § 10.5.2, at 98 (2d ed.
2006).
88. Id.
89. Peterson, supra note 61, at 811 n.18. HOEPA attempted to address problems of
"reverse redlining"-the targeting of individuals for " 'credit on unfair terms' based on
their income, race, or ethnicity." Williams v. Gelt Fin. Corp., 237 B.R. 590, 598-99 (E.D.
Pa. 1999) (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 21 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881,
1905); Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat.
2160 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d) (2006)). Failure to make certain "advance-look"
disclosures constitutes a failure to make "material disclosures" under TILA, which triggers
a borrower's right of rescission. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 9.3.10, at 696 (citing
15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 n.48 (2010)).
90. 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 1147.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a), (d), (e), (f) (2006); Truth in Lending Act Amendments of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, 109 Stat.
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the Federal Reserve Board added a new category of "higher-priced
mortgage loans" to Regulation Z.3 Lenders who issue these "higher-
priced" loans are subject to heightened disclosure requirements and
are required to more carefully scrutinize the borrower's ability to
repay the loan.94
B. TILA's Right of Rescission: A Crucial Tool in Deterring Lender
Overreaching
1. Comparing TILA Rescission and Common Law Rescission
TILA's rescission provisions shift significant leverage to
consumers by enhancing the protections provided to consumers under
common law causes of action and remedies,9 5 the oldest and most
basic forms of consumer protection.96 For example, under the
common law, a borrower seeking to rescind her mortgage loan as a
result of the lender's fraudulent misrepresentation must establish the
following elements: (1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its
materiality, (4) the defendant's knowledge of the representation's
falsity or ignorance of its truth (scienter), and (5) the borrower's
justifiable reliance on the representation.9 7 The borrower may have to
plead fraud with particularity and prove each element by clear and
convincing evidence.98
A borrower able to establish these elements must bring a
common law rescission action within a short time after the
transaction.99 Traditionally, moreover, the borrower needed to take
161 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(i) (2006)). See generally Jo Carrillo & Paul Kofoed, The
Sound of Silence: The Continuing Legal Debate over Class Action Rescission Under TILA,
6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing post-Rodash legislation and class action
rescission lawsuits).
93. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.35 (2010).
94. See id. A higher priced mortgage loan that contains a prepayment penalty in
violation of section 226.35(b)(2) is subject to TILA's extended right of rescission.
THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 28, § 6.4.2.4A, at 269.
95. See infra Part I.B.2.
96. DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW § 2:1, at 16 (2008-2009 ed.).
97. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at
728 (5th ed. 1984). Courts, however, "list anywhere from four to nine elements of the
common law fraudulent misrepresentation claim." DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 470, at 1345 (2000).
98. DOBBS, supra note 97, at 1345-46.
99. See, e.g., Warner v. Denis, 922 P.2d 1372, 1385 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
a right of rescission must be exercised within a "reasonable time" and emphasizing that
"[e]quity will not permit one party, in whose favor a right of rescission has arisen, to delay
unreasonably the exercise of the right and thus speculate on the rise or fall in the value of
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the first steps in restoring the lender to the status quo ante: the
borrower had to return the loan proceeds to the lender before the
court would require the lender to terminate its security interest in the
borrower's home and return accrued interest and fees. 100
TILA substantially liberalizes these requirements. TILA
rescission claims need not be pleaded with particularity. 0' TILA
violations are measured by a strict liability standard." Consequently,
creditors will be liable even for "technical or minor" violations.0 3 As
under the common law,'" a borrower seeking rescission under TILA
need not prove that the lender's disclosure violation caused actual
damage. 0
TILA, moreover, allows borrowers who have suffered a material
disclosure violation to unwind the loan transaction up to three years
following the loan closing.1o' It is unlikely that a borrower seeking to
rescind under the common law could bring a rescission action one,
two, or three years following the loan transaction, as TILA's
rescission provisions permit. TILA's lengthy extended rescission
period can complicate attempts to return the parties to their pre-
transaction positions in cases in which the value of the property has
the land"); JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 526 (1999) (explaining that
the rescission remedy is subject to abuse because the plaintiff may seek to unwind a
transaction not due to an "objective injury referable to the bargain or sale," but rather as a
result of "buyer remorse").
100. See, e.g., Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992);
Wells Fargo Bank v. Jaaskelainen, 407 B.R. 449, 455 (D. Mass. 2009); see also 26 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACrS § 68:24, at 284 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed.
2003) ("[R]escission is not allowable ... unless the party seeking to rescind can and does
first restore or offer to restore anything of value it has received under the contract. Action
must be taken within a reasonable time, and must be communicated to the other party.").
In modem equitable rescission cases, however, courts need not require plaintiffs to
"tender or offer restoration in [her] complaint, or show an ability to make restoration,"
since the court has the ability to condition relief on the plaintiffs restoration of the
defendant to the status quo ante. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-
EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.8, at 675 (2d ed. 1993).
101. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 7.6.6, at 552.
102. Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A creditor
who fails to comply with TILA in any respect is liable to the consumer ... regardless of
the nature of the violation or the creditor's intent.") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
103. Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 100, § 9.3(2), at 581-82.
105. See, e.g., Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 680 F.2d 927, 932 (3d Cir.)
("The Act allows recovery even when the complainant was not deceived by
misdisclosure."), vacated on other grounds per curiam, 459 U.S. 56 (1982); Bilal v.
Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Bilal), 296 B.R. 828, 833 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (citing
Herrera v. First N. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 805 F.2d 896, 900 (10th Cir. 1986)).
106. 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a)(3) (2010).
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depreciated substantially (and the borrower therefore is unable to
finance her tender obligation by selling her home or refinancing the
mortgage).10 7 This long limitations period, however, provides
significant protection to consumers who detect a defect in the loan
disclosures only after other related or unrelated complications with
the loan arise.
In addition, TILA reverses the order of events necessary to
restore the parties to the status quo ante. Section 1635(b) and its
implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d), set forth the
procedures governing rescission. Traditionally, under the common
law, the borrower had to tender before the court would require the
lender to terminate its security interest in the borrower's home and
return all interest and closing costs.'08 TILA, in contrast, places the
onus on the offending lender.109 Under TILA, after the borrower
notifies the lender or its assignee of her intent to rescind, section
1635(b) and its implementing regulation require the lender to cancel
its security interest in the borrower's home."0 Only after the creditor
complies with its obligations under the statute must the consumer
return the net loan proceeds (the loan principal minus all costs and
finance charges paid by the consumer over the loan term) to the
creditor.11'
The rescission process set forth in the statute in many ways
resembles a hostage exchange: each captor (the borrower or creditor)
is reluctant to give up her hostage (the tender obligation or security
interest, respectively) before the other party complies, since
unrequited release risks a near-complete loss of leverage. If the
borrower tenders to a creditor who refuses to release its security
interest in the borrower's home, the borrower, having relinquished a
large lump sum of cash and all of her bargaining power,1 2 must resort
to expensive legal process to force the lender to comply with its end
of the bargain. Conversely, if the lender releases its security interest
107. See infra Part II.
108. See supra text accompanying note 100.
109. See Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1974) ("Although tender of
consideration received is an equitable prerequisite to rescission, the requirement was
abolished by the Truth in Lending Act.").
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(d)(3).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(d)(3).
112. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PROPOSED REVISIONS TO REGULATIONS B, E, M,
Z, DD AND THE OFFICIAL STAFF COMMENTARIES 3 (2004) [hereinafter PROPOSED
REVISIONS], available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/banking-and-payment-systems/
archive/frbjan04.pdf.
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before the borrower tenders,1 13 the lender is rendered a vulnerable,
unsecured creditor, whose collateral is subject to attachment by lien
creditors.114 Courts have concluded that TILA's rescission sequence
imposes too substantial a burden on creditors; as a result, courts in
most cases revert to the common law unwinding process, requiring
the borrower to restore the lender to the status quo ante before the
lender must cancel its security interest in the borrower's home."'
Rescission can have a dramatic impact on the consumer's
ultimate financial obligation to the offending lender because "a valid
rescission relieves the consumer of any liability for payment of
finance or other charges incurred in connection with the rescinded
transaction.""' In a normal housing market, the amount the borrower
must return to the lender to cancel the loan-the consumer's tender
obligation-is likely to be significantly less than the borrower's
principal mortgage obligation, particularly if the borrower sought
rescission toward the end of the three-year extended rescission
period.117 When a consumer validly exercises her right of rescission,
she is not responsible for any finance charges or closing costs. 118 Thus,
in effect, all cash payments the consumer made between the loan
closing and the point at which the borrower exercised her rescission
rights are applied to the loan principal.119 In contrast, the majority of
the payments a non-rescinding borrower makes in the early years of a
loan are applied to the interest, which continues to accrue on a slowly
declining principal balance.120
TILA's legislative history provides little guidance as to the
precise reasons Congress created a rescission remedy. It is clear that
Congress intended to protect homeowners from abuse by dishonest
home improvement contractors who made questionable "home
improvements" financed by loans secured by borrowers' homes.121
113. For a description of courts' use of the word "tender" in the Truth in Lending Act
context, see supra note 23.
114. See infra text following notes 142-43.
115. See infra Part II.A.
116. In re Stuart, 367 B.R. 541, 552 n.12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).
117. See id.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006); Stuart, 367 B.R. at 552 n.12.
119. Stuart, 367 B.R. at 552 n.12.
120. Id.
121. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 28 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 264 ("This
provision was enacted to give the consumer the opportunity to reconsider any transaction
which would have the serious consequence of encumbering the title to his home."); see
Zakarian v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213-14 (D. Haw. 2009)
(noting that Congress created the statutory rescission right to "protect home owners from
certain sharp practices of home improvement contractors ... by creating a rescission right
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Beyond this articulated concern, however, courts and the Federal
Reserve Board have little information about rescission's precise
origins.
In spite of significant gaps in the legislative history of rescission
specifically, courts agree that, as a whole, TILA, a remedial statute,
must be "liberally construed in favor of borrowers." 2 2 TILA is
designed to protect borrowers who, relative to lenders, are
unsophisticated actors who possess less leverage in loan
negotiations.12 3 This disparity in bargaining power renders borrowers
vulnerable to overreaching and fraud by lenders. Thus, consistent
with the statute's overall consumer-protective purpose, Congress in
TILA's rescission provisions shifts significant leverage from lenders
to borrowers in setting forth a strict liability remedy that substantially
liberalizes the steps needed to unwind a mortgage transaction under
the common law.124
By reordering the common law rescission sequence and forcing
the lender to cancel its security interest first, TILA gives consumers
extra leverage in the hostage negotiation: the borrower need not
sacrifice a large sum of cash to a creditor who might drag its feet or
refuse to honor its end of the bargain.'25 Likewise, by forcing the
lender to act first by releasing its security interest, TILA gives the
borrower some time to seek financing for her tender obligation.12 6 If
the borrower were required to tender while the security interest
remained in place, a borrower would have difficulty funding her
tender obligation by refinancing the current mortgage loan, since title
to her home would be clouded.127 Because rescission is such a
"painless remedy" from the consumer's perspective and "plac[es] all
burdens on the creditor," it serves as an important deterrent in urging
for home improvement loans that were secured by residential mortgages on existing
dwellings").
122. Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1990) ("TILA, as a
remedial statute which is designed to balance the scales 'thought to be weighed in favor of
lenders,' is to be liberally construed in favor of borrowers." (quoting Bizier v. Globe Fin.
Servs., 654 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981))); see Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-
Tiered Consumer Finance Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its
Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L.
REv. 589, 638 (2000).
123. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 1.4.2.3.1, at 12.
124. See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
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creditors, under pain of an expensive unwinding process, to comply
with TILA's disclosure requirements.128
2. Conditional Rescission: A Reversion to the Common Law
Rescission Sequence
a. Background
Although TILA allows consumers to initiate the rescission
process without a court's intervention merely by sending a
cancellation notice1 29 to the holder of the note,130 creditors routinely
ignore the rescission notice 31 or respond by denying that they have
violated the statute.132 As a result, even though rescission under TILA
is a "non-judicial" remedy, courts frequently are forced to decide
whether or not the lender has committed a violation triggering a
borrower's right of rescission. For the most part, by intervening in the
rescission process, courts have interpreted TILA's rescission
provisions in ways that have reduced consumers' leverage under the
statute.133
The most notable and longstanding example of this
reapportionment of bargaining power is a practice known as
"conditional rescission"" or "judicial preconditioning."'3 5 Although
courts have ordered conditional rescission for nearly four decades,'36
the practice, due to a dramatic decline in housing values, has only
recently substantially complicated matters for many borrowers in
inability-to-tender cases. This section describes courts' rationale for
ordering conditional rescission, illustrating that courts have not
128. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 6.7.2.3, at 456 (citing Williams v.
Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992)).
129. For a description of a creditor's obligation to provide each borrower entitled to
rescind with two copies of a "Notice of Right to Cancel," see supra note 9.
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006).
131. See, e.g., Bookhart v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co., 559 F. Supp. 208, 209 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); In re Schweizer, 354 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006).
132. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Jaaskelainen, 407 B.R. 449, 453 (D. Mass. 2009).
133. For a description of how courts generally deny relief to borrowers who are unable
to tender in full and immediately, see infra Part II.A-B.
134. See, e.g., Zakarian v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215 (D.
Haw. 2009).
135. See, e.g., Celona v. Equitable Nat'l Bank, 98 B.R. 705, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1989). This
Article uses the term "conditional rescission." Most courts, however, use neither term and
generically describe this process, for example, as conditioning relief on the borrower's
satisfaction of her tender obligation. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Mortg. It, Inc., No. 09cv2103 WQH
(AB), 2010 WL 3220110, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010).
136. See, e.g., Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1974) (an early conditional
rescission case).
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hesitated to modify the plain language of the statute for the benefit of
lenders.
This Article does not critique the practice of conditional
rescission itself: in most cases, conditional rescission properly protects
creditors from the risk of forfeiture.137 This Article takes a more
nuanced view of the practice: because TILA is a remedial statute with
a consumer-protective function,3 courts that have ordered
conditional rescission to protect lenders from forfeiture likewise must
not hesitate to use their equitable authority to preserve rescission in
inability-to-tender cases. As a result of courts' application of
conditional rescission in inability-to-tender cases, consumers who are
substantially underwater on their mortgages-a sizeable percentage
of borrowers nationally-are, in effect, denied TILA's rescission-
based protection, risking validation of instances of lender
overreaching and fraud.
b. Courts' Rationale for Ordering Conditional Rescission
At the request of lenders defending rescission actions, courts
routinely use their equitable discretion to reverse the order of events
set forth in the statute,13 9 effectively reinstating the common law
sequence of events necessary to effectuate a rescission. Through this
process of "conditional rescission," courts require the borrower to
tender before the creditor invalidates its security interest in the
borrower's home.'" In the words of one court, conditional
rescission-an equitable modification of TILA's rescission process-
137. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
138. See, e.g., Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1990)
("TILA, as a remedial statute which is designed to balance the scales 'thought to be
weighed in favor of lenders,' is to be liberally construed in favor of borrowers." (quoting
Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., 654 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981))); Drysdale & Keest, supra note
122, at 638.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006).
140. See, e.g., Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992);
FDIC v. Hughes Dev. Co., 938 F.2d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 1991); Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank,
622 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980); Bustamante v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 619 F.2d
360, 365 (5th Cir. 1980); Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1221-22 (4th Cir. 1976);
LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1976); Palmer, 502 F.2d at 862. But see,
e.g., Celona v. Equitable Nat'l Bank (In re Celona), 90 B.R. 104, 115 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988) (allowing the borrower to rescind even though it "relegates the Creditor's claim to
unsecured, possibly uncollectible status"), aff'd, 98 B.R. 705; In re Piercy, 18 B.R. 1004,
1007-08 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (holding that the "judicial gloss" of requiring borrowers
to perform first should not be applied in cases where the borrower is filing for
bankruptcy).
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"ensure[s] that plaintiffs make good on their repayment obligations if
rescission is awarded."l4'
Lenders have successfully persuaded courts that following the
original order of events set forth in the statute-forcing lenders to
invalidate their security interests before borrowers tender-creates
an undue burden on and risk to lenders.142 If, after a lender has taken
steps to reflect the cancellation of its security interest in the
borrower's home, a borrower defaults on her tender obligation, the
lender, stripped of its secured status, must pursue the watered-down
collection remedies of an unsecured creditor. To collect the
outstanding debt-the borrower's tender obligation-a lender might
have to ask the court to reinstate the lender's security interest.
Alternatively, the lender might be required to sue the borrower and,
judgment in hand, attempt to levy on the debtor's unencumbered
property.
As a newly unsecured creditor, the lender would not be
guaranteed a full recovery of the net loan proceeds. The newly
unencumbered home might be partially or fully exempt under state
homestead exemption statutes. 143 Another unsecured creditor might
beat the lender in the "race of the diligent" and perfect its interest in
the borrower's unencumbered, non-exempt assets before the lender
does. Moreover, the debtor might seek bankruptcy protection while
simultaneously exercising her rescission rights under TILA,
potentially allowing the debtor to satisfy her tender obligation for
pennies on the dollar.144
141. Williams v. Saxon, No. 06-0799-WS-B, 2008 WL 45739, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 2,
2008).
142. See, e.g., Palmer, 502 F.2d at 862 (describing the combination of rescission and
statutory damages as an "unduly harsh penalty" if "the creditor is reduced to the status of
an unsecured creditor, and the debtors are judgment proof"); Stanley v. Household Fin.
Corp. III (In re Stanley), 315 B.R. 602, 615-16 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) ("The concept that a
debtor is entitled to a free home or financial windfall because a creditor failed to check a
box on a notice of right to rescind form is an irrational result that fails to recognize the full
scope and policy behind the TILA's rescission framework.").
143. Dawson v. Thomas (In re Dawson), 411 B.R. 1, 42 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) (ordering
conditional rescission in part because, if the lender's security interest were immediately
canceled, the plaintiff would be able to avail herself of a homestead exemption, which
would force the newly unsecured lender to seek repayment by levying on the debtor's
unencumbered, non-exempt property). For examples of homestead exemption statutes,
see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (unlimited exemption); D.C. CODE § 15-501(a)(14) (Supp.
2010) (unlimited); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(1)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009)
(capping exemption at $20,200 per debtor); TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 41.001-.002 (West 2000
& Supp. 2009-2010).
144. If the court classifies the debtor's tender obligation as an unsecured claim, the
debtor may discharge a sizeable portion of the tender amount in either Chapter 7 or
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Courts explain that their decision whether or not to change the
default order set out in the statute depends on the "equities" of each
case.145 For example, courts appear more willing to order conditional
rescission when the lender's TILA violations are not "egregious"
(e.g., when the disclosure errors do not appear intentional).146
Likewise, when the borrower has engaged in some kind of
reprehensible behavior (e.g., the borrower has misrepresented facts
on her loan application), courts are far more willing to condition
invalidation of the security interest on the borrower's tender.147
Some commentators have criticized conditional rescission as an
unwarranted deviation from the plain language of a remedial,
consumer-protective statute. 148 Arguably, a consumer who must
tender before the lender cancels its security interest in her home is no
better off than she would be without TILA's protection, since TILA's
rescission provisions shift leverage to borrowers by reversing the
order of the common law rescission sequence.149 By forcing TILA-
violating lenders to cancel their security interests first, Congress
increased TILA's deterrent role,5 o encouraged consumers to act as
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, through which a consumer may discharge a sizeable portion of her
unsecured debt. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1328(a) (2006); sources cited supra note 2.
145. See, e.g., Williams, 968 F.2d at 1142 (explaining that in determining whether or not
to order conditional rescission, a court "should consider traditional equitable notions,
including such factors as the severity of [the lender's] TILA violations and whether [the
borrower] has the ability to repay the principal amount"); Zakarian v. Option One Mortg.
Corp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1215-16 (D. Haw. 2009) (citing Palmer, 502 F.2d at 862)
(refusing to order conditional rescission when plaintiff alleged that lender had failed to
provide any required TILA disclosures).
146. See, e.g., Kratz v. Countrywide Bank, No. CV08-01233 DSF (OPx), 2009 WL
3063077, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009) ("Where the alleged TILA violations are not
egregious, courts not only may, but 'should,' condition rescission on repayment of the
amounts advanced by the lender." (quoting LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th
Cir. 1976))).
147. See, e.g., Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 819 (4th Cir. 2007)
(noting that it is proper for courts to consider borrower misrepresentation since the right
to rescind " 'remains an equitable doctrine subject to equitable considerations' " (quoting
Brown v. Nat'l Permanent Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 683 F.2d 444,447 (D.D.C. 1982))).
148. See generally Robert Murken, Comment, Can't Get No Satisfaction? Revising How
Courts Rescind Home Equity Loans Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 457
(2004) (arguing that conditional rescission has removed the statute's effectiveness at
preventing predatory lending); Note, Truth-in-Lending: Judicial Modification of the Right
of Rescission, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1227 (1974) (arguing that courts should allow rescission
without requiring tender).
149. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra
note 5, § 14:27, at 1054.
150. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140 ("[B]ecause rescission is such a painless remedy under
the statute (placing all burdens on the creditor), it acts as an important enforcement tool,
insuring creditor compliance with TILA's disclosure requirements.").
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"private attorneys general""s' in bringing rescission actions, and gave
consumers significant leverage in negotiating a possible settlement
with the lender. These policy goals are undermined if consumers must
tender first.
The controversy around conditional rescission itself has largely
subsided, however, because Congress added a provision in the Truth
in Lending Simplification and Reform Actl5 2 sanctioning the
longstanding practice.'53 In this amendment, Congress sought to
clarify that "the courts, at any time during the rescission process, may
impose equitable conditions to insure that the consumer meets his
obligations after the creditor has performed his obligations as
required under the act."' 54 Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board is
currently considering codifying conditional rescission, requiring a
borrower to tender before the creditor releases its security interest in
the borrower's home.155
Although courts routinely revert to the common law rescission
sequence by ordering conditional rescission, the practice has laid the
groundwork for a troublesome practice in rescission cases that has
deprived substantially underwater borrowers of TILA's rescission
protections: requiring consumers to tender in full immediately or
within a short period of time-or else risk the dismissal of their
rescission claims.
II. WHEN CONSUMERS CANNOT AFFORD TO TENDER:
CHOOSING BETWEEN A RETURN TO THE STATUS Quo ANTE AND
MEANINGFUL RESCISSION-BASED PROTECTION
Today's depressed housing market has substantially complicated
some borrowers' attempts to seek rescission during TILA's three-year
extended rescission period. Generally, a borrower seeking to rescind
either refinances her mortgage or sells her home, using the proceeds
of one of these transactions to pay off the mortgage written by the
offending lender.
151. Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., 654 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1981).
152. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
153. TILA's rescission provisions now provide that "[tihe procedures prescribed by
this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court." Truth in Lending
Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 125(b), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006)); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(4) (2010);
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 5, § 14:27, at 1054-55.
154. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236,265.
155. Regulation Z; Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,539, 58,547-48 (proposed Sept.
24,2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
2010] 197
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
As a result of a recent dramatic drop in home values across the
country, however, an increasing number of rescission-eligible
borrowers cannot afford to immediately tender. If the value of the
borrower's home has decreased considerably between the time the
borrower refinances her mortgage and when she seeks to rescind the
transaction, neither a sale of the home nor a mortgage refinancing can
generate 100% of the borrower's tender obligation. Thus, as a result
of a collapse in home values and a borrower's resulting inability to
finance the tender obligation, an intractable tension develops
between two goals of TILA's rescission remedy: returning the parties
to their pre-transaction positions (the status quo ante)'5 6 and
providing consumers with meaningful, strict-liability-based relief
through rescission when lenders commit a material disclosure error.'
Although courts have the equitable authority to modify consumers'
tender obligations by allowing consumers to repay the net loan
proceeds in installments, most courts have treated consumers'
repayment obligations in an all-or-nothing fashion: consumers are
required to tender in full immediately or within a short time, or their
rescission claims are eventually dismissed.
As this section explains, courts following the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Yamamoto v. Bank of New York' 8 generally dismiss
underwater borrowers' rescission actions before adjudicating the
rescission claim (i.e., determining whether or not the lender has
committed a material disclosure violation, thereby entitling the
borrower to rescind). Courts following Yamamoto reason that
dismissing such claims is a logical acceleration of the outcome in cases
in which courts apply conditional rescission: If a court orders
conditional rescission, a lender may retain its security interest until
the rescinding borrower fulfills her tender obligation. If the borrower
is unable to tender, the unwinding process will be suspended, perhaps
indefinitely. Given the apparent inevitable consequence of a
borrower's inability to tender, Yamamoto courts routinely eviscerate
TILA's protections by dismissing the rescission claims of borrowers
156. See, e.g., Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 820 (4th Cir. 2007);
McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418,421 (1st Cir. 2007); Williams v.
Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114,
119 (5th Cir. 1974).
157. Williams v. Saxon Mortg. Co., No. 06-0799-WS-B, 2008 WL 45739, at *4 (S.D. Ala.
Jan. 2, 2008) (describing restoring the parties to the status quo ante and "maintain[ing] the
vitality of rescission as an enforcement tool" as the "twin aims" of TILA's rescission
process (citing Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140, 1142)).
158. 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).
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who cannot afford to tender in full immediately or within a short
period of time."'
Courts that depart from the Yamamoto approach generally
adjudicate underwater borrowers' rescission claims but subsequently
order conditional rescission. These courts' application of conditional
rescission has the net effect of denying an underwater borrower
rescission-based relief, since the borrower must restore the lender to
the status quo ante before the court will order the lender to cancel its
security interest in her home and return interest and fees.
Courts' approaches in inability-to-tender cases can be grouped
into three categories:
Yamamoto and its Progeny: Judicial Nullification of a Crucial
Remedy
A number of courts (primarily those in the Ninth Circuit) allow
the lender to retain its security interest until the borrower tenders,
but frequently dismiss cases at the pleading stage if (1) borrowers
affirmatively acknowledge an inability to tender," (2) the facts
suggest that the borrower is unable to tender (e.g., the borrower has
defaulted on her mortgage or has substantial negative equity), 61 or
(3) the borrower has merely failed to plead in her complaint that she
has the ability to tender.1 62
Other Circuits: Complete Adjudication, but Relief for
Underwater Borrowers Remains Elusive
The majority of courts allow the lender to retain its security
interest until the borrower tenders, but, unlike courts in the Ninth
Circuit, generally choose not to dismiss the case at the pleading stage,
even if the facts suggest that the borrower will be unable to tender. 63
Borrowers in these cases have their "day in court" (i.e., courts fully
adjudicate their rescission claims), thereby increasing the likelihood
that the lenders will be willing to settle the case by modifying the
loans. If lenders refuse to settle, however, borrowers will be denied
159. See, e.g., Kratz v. Countrywide Bank, No. CVO8-01233 DSF (OPx), 2009 WL
3063077, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009).
160. See, e.g., Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1168.
161. See, e.g., Carlos v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV F 09-0260 [JO GSA,
2009 WL 1295873, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2009).
162. See, e.g., Rogers v. Cal State Mortg. Co., No. CV F 09-2107 LJO DLB, 2010 WL
144861, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan 11, 2010).
163. See, e.g., Jones v. REES-MAX, LLC, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 (D. Minn. 2007).
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rescission relief unless and until they tender, because courts routinely
order conditional rescission."
Alternative Approaches: Tendering in Installments
In limited cases in both the non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy
settings, courts have been willing to allow borrowers to repay their
tender obligations in installments over a period of years and at
reasonable interest rates.165 In these cases, the judge may or may not
order conditional rescission.
The following sections describe each of these general
approaches, explaining the extent to which each sustains or undercuts
TILA's consumer-protective functions.
A. Yamamoto and its Progeny: Judicial Nullification of a Crucial
Remedy
As a result of recent dramatic decreases in home values in the
western United States, 166 courts in the Ninth Circuit have encountered
the largest proportion of rescission cases in which homeowner
plaintiffs are unable to immediately tender in full. This depressed
housing market, combined with lower courts' widespread and
expansive application of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Yamamoto,
has largely eviscerated TILA's rescission provisions in inability-to-
tender cases. This section analyzes the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Yamamoto, describes how courts have interpreted that holding, and
identifies how courts' application of Yamamoto harms all consumers,
particularly those who are underwater.
In Yamamoto v. Bank of New York,' the plaintiffs sought
rescission and statutory damages under TILA, claiming that their
lender had failed to provide them with "Notice of Right to Cancel"
forms and had inaccurately disclosed real estate appraisal fees. 168 In a
deposition taken between the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and the defendants' cross-motion, the plaintiffs had
164. See, e.g., Jobe v. Argent Mortg. Co., No. 3:CV-06-00697, 2009 WL 2461168, at *5,
*7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2009).
165. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Vanguard Say. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F. Supp. 143, 144-45 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); Apaydin v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank (In re Apaydin), 201 B.R. 716, 718 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1996).
166. James R. Hagerty & Nick Timiraos, Debtor's Dilemma: Pay the Mortgage or Walk
Away, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009, at A22 (describing how an increasing number of
homeowners in Arizona, California, and Nevada, where home prices have plunged, are
considering "strategically defaulting" on their mortgages).
167. 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).
168. Id. at 1169.
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testified that, even if the court granted rescission, they could not
afford to tender.16 1
On the borrowers' rescission claim, the district court gave the
borrowers sixty days to tender the loan proceeds.170 After the
borrowers failed to tender, the district court dismissed the rescission
claim without reaching the question of whether the lender had
violated TILA.17 '
Agreeing with the district court, the Ninth Circuit explained that
courts had long exercised their equitable authority under TILA in
certain cases to condition invalidation of the security interest on the
debtor's fulfillment of her tender obligation. 172 According to the
court, conditional rescission can take place either before or after the
court determines whether or not the borrower is entitled to rescission:
if the court finds that "the borrower cannot comply with [her]
rescission obligations no matter what," a court can dismiss the
rescission action before deciding whether the defendants committed a
material disclosure error."'
The plaintiffs in Yamamoto had affirmatively acknowledged in
their depositions that, even if allowed to rescind their loan, they could
not afford to tender. After giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to
tender, the district court dismissed the rescission action.'74 In reliance
on Yamamoto, however, recently several courts in the Ninth Circuit
have gone further. These courts have dismissed rescission actions at
the pleading stage if the facts merely suggested that the plaintiffs
would be unable to tender (for example, if the plaintiffs had defaulted
on the mortgage)"' or if the plaintiffs had failed to allege in their
complaint that they could, in fact, afford to tender (for example, by
describing how they intended to finance the tender obligation). This
169. Id. at 1168.
170. Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, No. CV-99-00360SPK, slip op. at 9 (D. Haw.
Feb. 12, 2001), affd, 329 F.3d 1167. The district court dismissed the borrowers' claim for
statutory damages, since the one-year statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 2-3.
171. Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1168.
172. Id. at 1171.
173. Id. at 1173.
174. Id. at 1168.
175. See, e.g., Carlos v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV F 09-0260 LJO GSA,
2009 WL 1295873, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2009).
176. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. First Franklin Loan Servs., No. 1:09-CV-00941 AWI-GSA,
2010 WL 144862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss
because "[p]laintiff concede[d] that she cannot allege that she has the ability to tender");
Rogers v. Cal State Mortg. Co., No. CV F 09-2107 LJO DLB, 2010 WL 144861, at *10
(E.D. Cal. Jan 11, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff's rescission claim because "[t]he complaint's
silence on [the plaintiffs'] tender of loan proceeds is construed as their concession of
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approach is imprudent not only because it undercuts underwater
borrowers' rescission-based protections, but also, as some courts have
pointed out, these courts' expansion of Yamamoto generally violates
courts' obligation under Rule 12(b)(6)'. to interpret the allegations
and facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs."'
In Carlos v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,17 9 for example, the
plaintiffs, who sought rescission in an apparent attempt to forestall
foreclosure of their California home, offered in their complaint to
satisfy their tender obligation by surrendering their home or the
home's fair market value.s 0 The plaintiffs requested in the alternative
(if full repayment of their tender obligation was required) that the
"[d]efendants ... accept tender on reasonable terms and over a
reasonable period of time."'"'
The borrowers in Carlos, unlike those in Yamamoto, never
affirmatively acknowledged that they were unable to tender. In a
cryptic decision, however, the judge dismissed the borrowers'
rescission action because "[tihe complaint acknowledge[d] [the
borrowers'] inability to tender the loan proceeds."'82 Presumably, the
court inferred that a tender attempt would be futile, since (1) the
borrowers had defaulted on their mortgage payments;' (2) the
borrowers' home had collapsed in value, suggesting that a sale of the
home could not fully finance their tender obligation;" and (3) in the
inability to do so"); Logan v. ResMAE Mortg. Corp., No. 2:09-cv-01632-MCE-GGH, 2009
WL 5206716, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2009) (dismissing rescission claim where plaintiff
"failed to allege any offer of tender at any stage of the proceedings" because following
Yamamoto, courts in the Ninth Circuit "have required tender as a necessary element to
proceeding with a TILA claim").
177. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
178. When the borrower-plaintiffs do not affirmatively acknowledge an inability to
repay the net loan proceeds, courts' inference that the borrowers are unable to tender
usually violates courts' responsibility under Rule 12(b)(6) to interpret the allegations and
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Baldain v. Am. Home Mortg.
Servicing, Inc., No. CIV. S-09-0931 LKKlGGH, 2010 WL 56143, at *10-11 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
5, 2010) (rejecting creditor's motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to allege ability
to tender, but cautioning borrowers that "Yamamoto directs this court to require tender
prior to rescission in the majority of cases, and that plaintiffs will need to meet this
standard at subsequent stages").
179. No. CV F 09-0260 LJO GSA, 2009 WL 1295873 (E.D. Cal. May 8,2009).
180. Complaint for Rescission, Damages & Jury Demand at 9, Carlos, 2009 WL
1295873 (No. 09-0260).
181. Id. at 16.
182. Carlos, 2009 WL 1295873, at *4.
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id. at *3.
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complaint, the borrowers acknowledged an inability to tender 100%
of the net loan proceeds."'5
Under the approach typified in Carlos, a borrower risks dismissal
of her rescission claim not only if she acknowledges difficulty
returning the net loan proceeds, but also if the facts themselves
merely suggest that the plaintiff might have difficulty financing her
tender obligation.
In some rescission cases, courts in the Ninth Circuit have
explicitly referred to a plaintiff's ability to tender as a pleading
requirement. In Ung v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 86 for example, the
district court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff's rescission claim
when the plaintiff failed to plead her ability to tender the loan
proceeds."' Although the plaintiff had indicated in the complaint that
she was ready and willing to tender, she stated elsewhere that, since
she was in default on the loan, she could afford only to make monthly
payments under a modified loan.' Citing Yamamoto, the court
explained that it "has the discretion to require Plaintiff to tender
return of all monies received from the lender before ordering
rescission; accordingly, [it] has the discretion to require Plaintiff to
allege tender before proceeding."'
Underwater borrowers do not fare much better in those district
courts in the Ninth Circuit that reject the argument that, under
Yamamoto, a plaintiff's ability to tender is an essential element of a
TILA rescission claim. As these courts explain, because the
plaintiff-once the court orders conditional rescission-is required to
tender before the court will order the lender to restore the plaintiff to
the status quo ante, borrowers' inability to tender will ultimately
doom their rescission claims.19 0 In ING Bank v. Ahn,19 ' for example,
185. Id. at *4.
186. No. EDCV 09-893-VAP (OPx), 2009 WL 2902434 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4,2009).
187. Id. at *2-3.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id. at *3.
190. ING Bank v. Ahn, No. C 09-995 TEH, 2009 WL 2083965, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 13,
2009); Narvaes v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 07-00621 HG-LEK, 2009 WL 1227849, at *5, *9
(D. Haw. May 5, 2009) (acknowledging that "[c]ourts can grant summary judgment to a
lender in a TILA action for rescission if the borrower cannot establish his ability to tender
the loan proceeds," but refusing to dismiss plaintiffs' rescission claims since plaintiffs had
offered in their rescission letter to defendant to tender loan proceeds and, even if plaintiffs
were unable to tender, the decision to dismiss was not mandatory but within the judge's
equitable discretion); Horton v. California Credit Corp. Ret. Plan, No. 09cv274-IEG-NLS,
2009 WL 700223, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2009); Phleger v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., No. C 07-01686 SBA, 2009 WL 537189, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2009).
191. Ahn, 2009 WL 2083965, at *2.
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the judge noted that Yamamoto did not hold that a district court was
required to dismiss a case if the plaintiff failed to plead her ability to
tender." Rather, a trial court had the discretion to dismiss the case if
the court "concludes that the party seeking rescission is incapable of
performance."'9 3 The court explained that the plaintiffs would,
however, eventually need to "demonstrate their ability to fully
effectuate a rescission for the [ciourt to enter an order of
rescission." 94 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs did not have to make such a
showing at such an early stage of the litigation.19
Yamamoto and its progeny are troubling because these cases
obliterate consumers' leverage under TILA's rescission provisions.
As interpreted by most courts, Yamamoto requires consumers to
prove their ability to tender the net loan proceeds before the court
can decide whether or not a lender has committed a TILA violation
entitling the consumer to rescind. The Ninth Circuit in Yamamoto, in
effect, "created a non-waiveable bond requirement: to get her day in
court, a consumer must pay up first." 96 As a result, TILA's deterrent
effect on would-be overreaching lenders is undermined.
In response to Yamamoto, the Federal Reserve Board added
weak language to its Official Staff Commentary suggesting-but not
requiring-that courts adjudicate the borrower's rescission claim
before determining how, exactly, to effectuate the rescission (e.g.,
deciding whether or not it will order conditional rescission). 9 7 The
cases discussed in this section illustrate that most courts in the Ninth
Circuit have largely ignored the Federal Reserve Board's irresolute
opinion.
Regardless of the merits of the TILA rescission claim or the
severity of the lender's alleged disclosure error, creditors in the Ninth
Circuit have little incentive to negotiate a settlement-a loan





196. See PROPOSED REVISIONS, supra note 112, at 4.
197. Federal Reserve System, 69 Fed. Reg. 16,769, 16,772 (Mar. 31, 2004). The Official
Staff Commentary now provides: "Where the consumer's right to rescind is contested by
the creditor, a court would normally determine whether the consumer has a right to
rescind and determine the amounts owed before establishing the procedures for the
parties to tender any money or property." 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 supp. I (2010) (emphasis
added). The National Consumer Law Center's suggestion that the Federal Reserve Board
replace the phrase "would normally" with the word "must" was not adopted. See
PROPOSED REVISIONS, supra note 112, at 4.
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Because an underwater borrower is unable to tender,198 under most
courts' interpretation of Yamamoto, that borrower will not have the
opportunity to prove in court that the lender has violated TILA. As
predicted by the National Consumer Law Center, creditors in the
Ninth Circuit routinely "contest all rescission notices and move to
dismiss in the hopes that the consumer cannot tender immediately. "
Yamamoto and its progeny fail to recognize that a consumer who
appears at the outset of the case unable to tender will not necessarily
remain incapable of repaying the lender. In dismissing inability-to-
tender cases at the pleading stage, courts are exercising judicial
euthanasia in spite of the patient's fighting chance at survival. Most
significantly, a consumer who brings a TILA rescission claim may
have other viable causes of action.20 Damages awarded under these
additional claims, if the plaintiff is successful, would reduce her total
obligation to the creditor.201 In other words, the borrower's tender
obligation cannot be calculated with certainty at such an early stage
of the litigation.
In addition, in limited cases, borrowers whose tender obligations
only slightly eclipse the value of their homes may be able to refinance
their mortgage loans with community banks or nonprofit lenders.12
These lenders' underwriting standards may be slightly more relaxed
than those of larger banks. These opportunities, however, are few and
far between.2 03 Nevertheless, "cutting consumers off at the knees"1204
by dismissing potentially viable TILA rescission claims at the outset
of rescission cases inequitably penalizes borrowers for what may be a
temporary inability to tender.
Regardless of whether or not a plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit must
demonstrate an ability to tender to survive a motion to dismiss,
consumers in the western United States whose home values have
198. See THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 28, § 6.8.2, at 293.
199. See PROPOSED REVISIONS, supra note 112, at 4; Telephone Interview with Dan
Mulligan, supra note 48.
200. THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 28, § 6.9.8.1, at 298 (advising attorneys,
particularly those handling inability-to-tender cases, to "be alert to other claims to further
reduce the ultimate tender amount"); 2 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE,
CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 443, at 79 (Supp.
2009) (indicating that a TILA violation may also constitute a violation of a state's unfair
and deceptive acts and practices statute).
201. See THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 28, § 6.9.8.1, at 298.
202. Telephone Interview with Daniel Lindsey, Supervisory Attorney, Legal
Assistance Found. of Metro. Chi. (Jan. 27, 2010).
203. Specifically, only attorneys with significant community contacts (e.g., legal aid
attorneys) may be able to negotiate such a financing arrangement. Id.
204. Id.
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dropped dramatically and who, as a result, cannot tender in full and
immediately, have little hope of seeking rescission in the non-
bankruptcy setting.
B. Other Circuits: Complete Adjudication, but Relief for Underwater
Borrowers Remains Elusive
1. Background
A small but growing fraction of courts outside the Ninth Circuit
follow Yamamoto, opting to dismiss rescission claims in inability-to-
tender cases before determining whether or not the lender has, in
fact, committed a material disclosure violation.205 The majority of
courts outside the Ninth Circuit, however, do not require borrowers
to prove their capacity to repay the net loan proceeds before the
court adjudicates their rescission claims.206
Nevertheless, all across the country, courts routinely order
conditional rescission, requiring borrowers to restore the lender to
the status quo ante by repaying the net loan proceeds 207 before
granting the borrower any relief under TILA. Thus, while courts not
205. See, e.g., Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 818, 821 (4th Cir.
2007) (affirming district court's summary judgment dismissal of borrower's rescission
claim based on conversation between borrower and creditor in which borrower claimed he
was "unable" to return the loan proceeds but attempted to negotiate a sale of house to
creditor; the Fourth Circuit acknowledged, however, that the "better practice" may have
been to first give the plaintiffs a "time certain" in which to tender the net loan proceeds);
Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, 597 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616-17 (E.D. Va. 2009) (rejecting
defendant's request that court disregard plaintiff's professed ability to tender based on
declining housing values when ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss and viewing facts in
light most favorable to plaintiff). The Moore court notes, however, that subsequent
"pro[of] [of plaintiff's] inability to tender" would allow court to exercise its discretion to
deny rescission to plaintiff. Id.
206. See, e.g., Prince v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 08-00574-KD-N, 2009 WL 2998141,
at *5 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2009) (denying creditor's "premature" motion to dismiss, which
was based on "nothing more than mere speculation that the Plaintiffs are incapable of
performing if rescission is ordered," and indicating that the court would "address the
proper procedures for implementing the rescission" only if, after a trial on the merits, the
court concluded that the borrowers were entitled to rescind the loan); Jobe v. Argent
Mortg. Co., No. 3:CV-06-00697, 2009 WL 2461168, at *5, *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2009)
(concluding after a non-jury trial that the defendant had not violated TILA, but noting
that even if the plaintiffs had successfully established a TILA violation, rescission would
nevertheless be inappropriate because the plaintiffs had acknowledged their inability to
tender in full and had defaulted on their mortgage, property tax, and property insurance
obligations); Jones v. REES-MAX, LLC, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 (D. Minn. 2007)
(rejecting creditor's summary judgment argument that borrowers "[were] not entitled to
rescission" because they "[had] not met their burden of demonstrating that they could
tender the value of the property within a reasonable period").
207. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
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directly bound by Yamamoto are more likely to fully adjudicate
rescission claims, a borrower's inability to tender dooms her case to
failure and precludes relief for a creditor's disclosure violations. If,
after the court determines that a plaintiff has a right to rescind,
borrowers cannot tender in full immediately or within the timeframe
prescribed by the court, lenders who have violated TILA need not
return borrowers to the status quo ante by releasing their security
interests and returning fees and finance charges.
In one respect, however, borrowers outside of the Ninth Circuit
fare significantly better than their counterparts. Because courts not
bound by Yamamoto generally reject creditors' arguments that
plaintiffs must establish an ability to tender at an early stage of the
litigation to salvage their claims, creditors-conscious of swelling
costs and attorneys' fees-are more likely to consider settling these
cases. This result is a significant improvement over the fate of
borrowers' rescission cases in courts applying Yamamoto.
Yamamoto's orbit, however, continues to expand beyond the Ninth
Circuit.208 Moreover, as the number of inability-to-tender cases grows,
creditors-after evaluating the dismal loan-to-value ratio of
underwater consumers' mortgages-can be increasingly confident
that borrowers will ultimately be unable to tender. These creditors
may be less interested in settling inability-to-tender cases. Thus, even
outside the Ninth Circuit, the fate of underwater borrowers'
rescission claims appears increasingly dismal.
This section examines two cases that depart from the approach
adopted in Yamamoto. While the outcome in these cases is an
improvement over those in which courts dismiss inability-to-tender
cases at an immature stage in the litigation, only a more
comprehensive approach-such as allowing borrowers to tender in
installments-will provide the vast majority of borrowers with
comprehensive protection under TILA.
2. Illustrative Cases
In FDIC v. Hughes Development Co.,209 the United States
District Court in Minnesota considered cross-motions for summary
judgment on a foreclosure action brought by the FDIC, the receiver
of the insolvent bank that originally wrote the borrowers' mortgage.210
The borrowers argued that they had received none of the required
208. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
209. 684 F. Supp. 616 (D. Minn. 1988).
210. Id. at 618.
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TILA disclosures, a claim the FDIC did not contest. 2 11 The court
concluded that the borrowers were entitled to rescind the loan, but
ordered conditional rescission out of concern that "the [borrowers']
apparently weak financial position w[ould] prevent them from
repaying the principal." 2 12 The court rejected the FDIC's argument
that the borrowers' rescission letter was invalid without a
contemporaneous tender of the loan proceeds.2 13 Instead, the court
gave the borrowers a "reasonable time" of one year to tender the
loan proceeds. 214 If the plaintiffs failed to tender within one year, the
FDIC could foreclose on the mortgage.21 s
In Williams v. Saxon Mortgage Co.,216 the borrowers sought to
rescind their thirty-year, adjustable-rate mortgage with a teaser rate
of 8.99% and an APR of 11.5%, alleging that the creditor had failed
to disclose $920 in various finance charges.2 17 In its summary
judgment motion, the creditor asked that the court order the plaintiffs
to provide within thirty days "definitive evidence" 2 18 of their ability to
tender should they prevail on their rescission claim. 2 19 If the plaintiffs
were unable to make such a showing, the creditor argued that the
court should dismiss the rescission action with prejudice.220 The
creditor requested in the alternative that the court either: (1) order
conditional rescission, or (2) require the parties to restore one
another simultaneously to the status quo ante.221
The court listed three reasons for rejecting the creditor's request
that the court require the plaintiffs to promptly prove their ability to
restore the creditor to the status quo ante. First, by demanding that
the plaintiffs demonstrate an ability to tender, the creditor (the
summary judgment movant) was attempting to shift to the plaintiffs
(the non-movants) the burden of proving the absence of any genuine
issues of material fact.222 The creditor had failed to establish that the
211. Id. at 625.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 620, 626.
214. Id. at 626.
215. Id.
216. No. 06-0799-WS-B, 2008 WL 45739 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2008).
217. Id. at *1.




222. Id. at *5.
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plaintiffs were incapable of tendering: its concerns, rather, were based
on "inchoate, undeveloped fears." 223
Second, the court noted that even if it were the plaintiffs' burden
to prove their ability to tender on the defendant's summary judgment
motion, the plaintiffs had successfully demonstrated an ability to
repay the net loan proceeds.224
Third, the court explained that even if the creditors had properly
and successfully established the borrowers' inability to tender, the
court would not dismiss the case at that juncture.22 5 Specifically, the
court would decline to "exercise its discretion to extinguish plaintiffs'
right of rescission altogether based on the mere possibility that
plaintiffs may encounter difficulty in refinancing the [initial] loan."226
The court declined the creditor's invitation to rely on Yamamoto,
which was distinguishable: in that case, " 'it [was] clear from the
evidence that the borrower lack[ed] capacity to pay back what she
ha[d] received.' "227 In contrast, the court observed, "no such clarity
exist[ed]" in the present case.22
The court also refused to order conditional rescission at the
current stage of the litigation, since to do so would be "putting the
cart before the horse."229 Relying on the Federal Reserve Board's
cautionary post-Yamamoto commentary, the court concluded that it
was unnecessary to determine the logistics of the rescission process
before: (1) the court adjudicated the borrowers' rescission claim, and
223. Id. at *6.
224. The plaintiffs claimed that they were capable of financing their tender obligation
by refinancing their current loan, since they were not underwater on their mortgage and
the husband was employed full-time. Id. at *5. It is unclear, however, whether or not the
borrowers were, in fact, above water. Although the borrowers submitted evidence that the
home's value was $44,500, they relied on a three-year-old appraisal from March 2005. Id.
From 2005 to 2008-the point at which the court ruled on the summary judgment
motion-the value of Alabama homes declined substantially. However, even if the
borrowers were slightly underwater, they may have been capable of fulfilling their tender
obligation. To calculate the borrowers' tender obligation, the court would have to deduct
from the original principal balance of $40,050 (1) payments made by the borrowers, (2)
accrued finance charges, and (3) fees. Id. at *1. Provided the value of the home was equal
to or greater than their tender obligation, the borrowers would have been able to finance
their repayment obligation either through a refinancing or a sale.
225. Id. at *6.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *6 n.10 (quoting Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th
Cir. 2003)). In Yamamoto, the borrowers had acknowledged in deposition testimony their
inability to tender. Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003).
228. Williams, 2008 WL 45739, at *6 n.10.
229. Id. at *7.
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(2) the parties had had an opportunity to agree among themselves
how to return one another to the status quo ante.230
The outcomes in Hughes and Williams are more consistent with
TILA's consumer-protective functions than are cases that strictly
apply Yamamoto. In cases like Hughes and Williams, a borrower's
rescission claim is not doomed at the outset for what may be a
plaintiff's temporary inability to tender. Many courts that depart from
the approach embraced in Yamamoto correctly recognize how
difficult it can be to accurately assess either at the motion to dismiss
or summary judgment stage a plaintiff's post-adjudication capacity to
tender. An underwater plaintiff may ultimately prove able to restore
her creditor to the status quo ante by (1) relying on damages from
other successful claims to reduce her overall obligation to the
creditor; (2) seeking loans from friends and family to help reduce the
deficiency between the tender obligation and the value of her home;
or (3) attempting to refinance the loan with a community bank, whose
underwriting standards might be somewhat less rigorous than those of
large commercial banks. However remote these possibilities,
borrowers, as Hughes and Williams implicitly recognize, deserve an
opportunity to defend their rescission claims from premature
dismissal-a result most consistent with TILA's consumer-protective
functions and origins.
Significantly, a borrower with a strong rescission claim that a
court does not dismiss prematurely is more likely to reach a
settlement with her lender (most likely, a loan modification). 231 This
result is consistent with the consumer-protective purpose of a statute
with a private right of action. TILA's plain language places all
burdens on the creditor; placing on the borrower the onus of proving
an ability to tender, particularly before a court has the opportunity to
adjudicate the borrower's rescission claim, would substantially
undermine TILA's consumer-protective function. A borrower with a
viable rescission claim must be afforded the opportunity (1) to have
the claim adjudicated and (2) to reach a settlement with the lender
based on the strength of that claim.
While these courts' reasoning highlights the logical deficiencies
in Yamamoto and related cases, courts can do more. Allowing
borrowers to tender in installments preserves TILA's rescission
remedy for an increasing number of underwater homeowners.
230. Id.
231. See E-mail from Pamela Simmons, supra note 38.
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C. Alternative Approaches: Tendering in Installments
It is crucial for courts to adjudicate homeowners' rescission
claims before entertaining creditors' arguments that plaintiffs are
unable to restore creditors to the status quo ante. Moreover, once
courts determine that borrowers are entitled to rescission, courts must
be willing to exercise flexibility in crafting the logistics of the
rescission process. In the following cases, courts properly used their
equitable discretion to allow borrowers-the intended beneficiaries
of TILA's rescission provisions-to return the net loan proceeds to
creditors in installment payments. These approaches are instructive to
all courts adjudicating inability-to-tender cases.
1. Non-Bankruptcy Courts
In Mayfield v. Vanguard Savings & Loan Ass'n,232 the plaintiffs
borrowed $14,000 in August 1986 to refinance their second mortgage
(among other reasons).233 The loan was payable in monthly
installments of $245.88 over fifteen years at a twenty percent interest
rate.234 Approximately five months later, the borrowers informed the
lender that their fixed incomes made it difficult for them to pay both
their first mortgage payment of $171 and their second mortgage
payment of $245.88.235 At the lender's suggestion, the borrowers in
January 1987 consolidated both mortgages into a new refinance loan
of $24,686.04, payable in monthly installments of $477.07 at a twenty
percent interest rate. 236 The court concluded that the borrowers were
entitled to rescind both (1) the August 1986 second mortgage
refinance loan and (2) the January 1987 consolidation refinance loan,
since, in each transaction, the lender failed to specify in the "Notice of
Right to Cancel" when the borrowers' three-day rescission period
expired and incorrectly referred to each loan as a purchase-money
mortgage.237
232. 710 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
233. Id. at 144-45. The borrowers received $4,716.23 in cash proceeds from the loan.
Id. at 144. They used additional loan proceeds to pay a water and sewer bill ($1,428.72)
and to make a payment due on their first mortgage ($870.76). Id.
234. Id. at 145.
235. Id.
236. Id. Presumably, the borrowers' action was precipitated in part by the lender's
apparent misrepresentation that the consolidation loan would reduce the borrowers' total
monthly mortgage obligations. The borrowers appear to be victims of "churning." See
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 275-76 (9th ed. 2009).
237. Mayfield, 710 F. Supp. at 146.
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The court refused to order conditional rescission,3 ordered the
lender to cancel its security interest in the borrowers' home
immediately, and allowed the plaintiffs to repay their $16,113.62
tender obligation at $171 per month,239 the amount of the borrowers'
mortgage payment prior to the two rescinded loan refinancings.24
Taking a broad, reformist interpretation of TILA's objectives, the
court appeared to reason that reinstating the borrowers' $171
monthly payment was consistent with Congress's goal through
rescission of restoring the parties to the status quo ante.
In Shepeard v. Quality Siding & Window Factory, Inc. ,241 a home
improvement loan case, the borrower entered into a credit agreement
for the purchase and installation of siding on her home.242 The court
identified several TILA disclosure errors, including a failure to
disclose the payment schedule,2 43 and concluded that the borrower
was entitled to rescind the loan.2 " Ordering the lender to immediately
cancel its security interest in the borrower's home, the court allowed
the borrower to repay to the lender the value of the aluminum siding
and installation services she received, less interest and finance
charges, at $199 per month-the borrower's original monthly
payment to the defendant.245
In Bookhart v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co.,2" the court
found that the lender failed to clearly disclose the fact that, when it
refinanced the borrowers' prior loan, the lender acquired a new
mortgage in the borrowers' home and retained its prior security
interest. 2 47 The court permitted the borrowers to repay $1,376248 in
238. For a description of the practice of conditional rescission, see supra Part I.B.2.
239. The court calculated the borrower's tender obligation by tallying the funds the
defendant advanced over the course of both loan transactions to (1) pay off current
mortgage obligations, (2) advance some cash to the borrower, and (3) satisfy outstanding
water and sewer bills; from this total, the court deducted (1) all payments made by the
borrower on both loans and (2) closing costs. See Mayfield, 710 F. Supp. at 148-49 & nn.3-
4.
240. Id. at 149.
241. 730 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Del. 1990).
242. Id. at 1296-97.
243. Id. at 1300-02.
244. Id. at 1304.
245. Id. at 1309.
246. 559 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
247. Id. at 211.
248. The plaintiffs were required to return to the defendant the difference between the
amount financed ($3,412.20) and the total payments they had made to the lender ($2,036).
Id. at 212. The finance charge was cancelled by virtue of the rescission. Id.
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monthly installments of $15 and required the lender to cancel its
security interests in the borrowers' home.249
The borrowers in both Mayfield and Shepeard did not appear to
be underwater and presumably were capable of tendering promptly
and in full either through a refinancing or a sale of their homes. The
courts, however, took a broad, consumer-protective view of the
policies underlying rescission, concluding that, while lenders had to
be made whole through the borrowers' tender obligations, borrowers
could unwind the mortgage transactions slowly and affordably. These
cases indicate that it is reasonable and feasible to allow rescission
plaintiffs to tender in installments.
While these cases are instructive to courts considering how to
structure the tender repayment process, the precise outcome in these
cases should not be duplicated for an important reason: the plaintiffs
in Mayfield, Shepeard, and Bookhart were not required to pay
interest on their tender installment payments.250 Presumably, the
courts reached this result either because (1) they interpreted the
TILA violations as very severe or (2) TILA provides that a borrower
who exercises his or her right to rescind "is not liable for any finance
or other charge." Undoubtedly, for the lender to return the
borrower to her pre-loan transaction position, the lender must return
to the borrower all finance charges (including interest) and closing
costs the borrower paid to the lender between the loan closing and
the time she exercised her right of rescission.252
When, however, the court exercises its equitable discretion by
allowing the borrower to return the lender to the status quo ante over
time by making installment payments on her tender obligation,
requiring the borrower to pay interest is necessary and appropriate to
compensate the lender for the loss of the time-value of money (the
opportunity cost suffered by the lender as a result of receiving the
money over time rather than in a lump sum). A reasonable interest
payment also compensates the lender for the risk of nonpayment and
the possibility that inflation may cause the value of a dollar to decline
before the debtor completes the repayment process.
249. Id. at 213.
250. The courts did not mention this fact explicitly, but subsequent interpretations of
these cases are consistent with this observation. See, e.g., Bell v. Parkway Mortg., Inc. (In
re Bell) (Bell II), 314 B.R. 54, 61 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004).
251. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006).
252. See id.
2010]1 213
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Focusing, as these courts did, on an affordable installment
payment plan is important to realizing the goals of TILA's rescission
provisions for all borrowers-not only those who can afford to
finance their tender obligations in full and immediately or within a
short time. As this Article argues, imposing on offending lenders the
cost of a gradual return to the status quo ante is a result more
equitable than depriving a class of underwater borrowers the benefit
of TILA's rescission-based protections.
In providing consumers with a strong private right of action in
TILA's rescission provisions, Congress recognized that litigation is
necessary to secure creditors' compliance with TILA's disclosure
rules. If TILA's most meaningful remedies are not accessible to
underwater borrowers-an increasing percentage of TILA
litigants2 3-courts risk incentivizing lenders to engage in
overreaching and misrepresentation to the extent that both increase
lenders' bottom lines.
2. Bankruptcy Courts
a. The Significance of Conditional Rescission in Bankruptcy
Cases
The Bankruptcy Code establishes a collective forum in which all
of a consumer's debts-secured and unsecured-are categorized and
satisfied either through a sale of all of the debtor's non-exempt 254
assets (a Chapter 7 liquidation)255 or through the creation of a plan
under which the debtor agrees to pay creditors' claims from future
income over a three-year or five-year period (a Chapter 13
rehabilitation).256 In bankruptcy, the fate of a borrower's rescission
claim in inability-to-tender cases largely depends on whether or not
the judge orders conditional rescission 257 and, therefore, whether the
borrower's tender obligation will be classified as an unsecured or
secured claim. This categorization is critical to lenders, since secured
creditors fare much better in bankruptcy than do unsecured
253. See Telephone Interview with Pamela Simmons, supra note 13 (describing as a
"growing problem" the number of underwater TILA litigants who are unable to tender).
254. Consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's goal of providing debtors with a "fresh
start," Chapter 7 debtors may retain certain property that they already owned at the time
of bankruptcy. TABB, supra note 26, § 5.11, at 434 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)).
255. Liquidation bankruptcy, also known as "straight" bankruptcy, is governed by
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1.1, at 2.
256. Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, individuals may adjust their debts
through a repayment plan of three to five years. Id. § 1.2, at 6.
257. See infra Part II.C.2.a.
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creditors25-the "unwashed masses" of claimants consisting of credit
card companies, personal creditors, and tort victims.
The majority of bankruptcy courts refuse to order conditional
rescission.259 Instead, these courts require the lender to invalidate its
security interest first, consistent with TILA's plain language.2 In
these cases, the lender will be treated as an unsecured creditor, and
the borrower's repayment obligation will be classified as an
unsecured claim.261 In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases,
unsecured claims typically are paid out at a fraction of the face value
of the debt.262
Bankruptcy courts that have adopted the majority view have
reasoned that voiding the lender's lien and treating the lender as an
unsecured creditor are necessary to allow a debtor who has raised a
valid rescission claim to simultaneously invoke the protections of
both TILA and the Bankruptcy Code.263 These courts are reluctant to
deviate from the plain language of TILA and order conditional
rescission if to do so would, in effect, permit the lender to retain its
favored, secured position in bankruptcy, when the lender, if the court
adhered to TILA's original rescission sequence, would otherwise be
relegated to unsecured-creditor status. These courts are hesitant to
upset the clear hierarchy of interests established by Congress in the
Bankruptcy Code. In addition, under this view, ordering conditional
rescission would require the debtor to pay the lender (who would
otherwise be an unsecured creditor) in full, thereby impairing the
debtor's prospects of achieving a "fresh start" in bankruptcy.264
In a minority of bankruptcy decisions, however, judges routinely
order conditional rescission,265 the dominant approach in non-
258. Whereas unsecured creditors in consumer bankruptcy cases typically receive a
fraction of the face value of their claims, see sources cited supra note 2, secured creditors
are entitled to be paid in full up to the value of the collateral securing their claims, TABB,
supra note 26, § 7.27, at 735; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006).
259. RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 6.8.4, at 468-69; see, e.g., Williams v. Gelt
Fin. Corp., 237 B.R. 590, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1999); In re Bilal, 296 B.R. 828, 840 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2003); Whitley v. Rhodes Fin. Servs. (In re Whitley), 177 B.R. 142, 152 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1995); In re Piercy, 18 B.R. 1004, 1007-08 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006).
261. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 6.8.4, at 468; e.g., cases cited supra note
259.
262. See sources cited supra note 2.
263. See, e.g., Piercy, 18 B.R. at 1007; RENUART & KEEST, supra note 11, § 6.8.4, at
468-69.
264. Piercy, 18 B.R. at 1007-08.
265. See, e.g., Quenzer v. Advanta Mortg. Corp. USA, 288 B.R. 884, 889 (D. Kan.
2003) ("Even though defendant violated TILA, automatically relegating its entire claim to
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bankruptcy court settings.2" If a bankruptcy judge orders conditional
rescission, the lender retains its security interest until the borrower
fulfills its tender obligation and all other claims as part of the
bankruptcy case. In these cases, the lender will be treated as a secured
creditor, and the borrower's repayment obligation will be classified as
a secured claim. In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases, secured
creditors are paid in full up to the value of the collateral securing
their claims.267
Like many non-bankruptcy courts, many bankruptcy courts that
have ordered conditional rescission have done so to prevent debtors
from enjoying a "windfall" for seemingly technical disclosure
errors.268 Several courts, citing TILA's legislative history, have
pointed out that Congress, in amending TILA to codify courts'
routine practice of reverting to the common law rescission
unsecured status under these circumstances would be completely inequitable and would
exact a penalty entirely disproportionate to its offense."); Ray v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 228 F.
Supp. 2d 664, 671 (D. Md. 2002); Webster v. Centex Home Equity Corp. (In re Webster),
300 B.R. 787, 804 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2003); Wepsic v. Josephson (In Re Wepsic), 231
B.R. 768, 776 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting debtor's proposal to treat creditor's claim
as unsecured and pay over the course of three or more years as contrary to rescission's
purpose to return parties to status quo ante); In re Apaydin, 201 B.R. 716, 718 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Even though the defendants engaged in flagrant violations of TILA,
automatically relegating their entire claim to unsecured status would be an utterly
disproportionate and completely inequitable penalty .... "); Thorp Loan & Thrift Co. v.
Buckles (In re Buckles), 189 B.R. 752, 766 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995); Lynch v. GMAC
Mortg. Corp. (In re Lynch), 170 B.R. 26,30 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (concluding that voiding
of lien and relegating creditor to unsecured status would allow debtor to pay the creditor
only a small fraction of its claim under the Chapter 13 plan, a consequence that Congress
could not have contemplated). But see Williams v. BankOne Nat'l Ass'n (In re Williams),
291 B.R. 636, 655-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003) (arguing that Congress intended to modify
common law rescission practice and finding that "part of the rescission scheme which
provides for the voiding of a creditor's security interest before the obligor has made
payment should be applied as written unless Congress has specifically indicated that courts
have the authority to modify it").
266. See supra Part II.B.2.
267. In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, unless the debtor redeems property subject to a security
interest, 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2006), or persuades the creditor to enter into a reaffirmation
agreement, 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2006), the trustee must return the collateral to the secured
creditor, 11 U.S.C. § 725 (2006). TABB, supra note 26, § 7.25, at 728, § 7.32(c), at 783-86. In
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a secured creditor must receive at least the value of its secured
claim (which normally is the value of its collateral). Id. § 1.25, at 108 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(5) (2006)).
268. See, e.g., Quenzer, 288 B.R. at 889 ("Even though the defendant violated TILA,
automatically relegating its entire claim to unsecured status under these circumstances
would be completely inequitable and would exact a penalty entirely disproportionate to its
offense."); In re Lynch, 170 B.R. at 30 ("Accepting [the debtors'] position would allow
chapter 13 to be utilized to provide a windfall not contemplated by the provisions of
chapter 13.").
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269sequence, specifically contemplated that courts would order
conditional rescission in the bankruptcy context.270 The legislative
history provides that "a court might use [its] discretion [to modify
TILA's default rescission sequence] in a situation where a consumer
in bankruptcy or wage earner proceedings is prohibited from
returning the property." 271
In addition, some bankruptcy courts have concluded that
stripping lenders of their security interests by following TILA's
default rescission sequence allows debtors to circumvent the
Bankruptcy Code's prohibition on the modification of claims on a
debtor's principal residence.272 In Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a debtor
who is underwater on a television, car, or most other assets can split,
or "bifurcate," the secured lender's claim into two portions: a secured
portion represented by the fair market value of the collateral (to be
paid in full), and an unsecured portion calculated by subtracting the
value of the collateral from the full amount of the debt owed (to be
paid at a fraction of the face value of the debt).2 73 Thus, an
underwater debtor can satisfy a debt to its lender for less than the
face value of the claim. For example, a borrower in bankruptcy who
owes $1,500 on a high-definition television worth $900 can "strip
down" the creditor's claim to the value of the collateral-$900. The
$900 portion of the claim must be paid in full. The deficiency of $600
is treated as an unsecured claim, which generally is paid out to
creditors at a fraction of the face value of the claim.
Congress, however, prohibits underwater homeowners from
modifying residential mortgages in bankruptcy. 274 A homeowner who
owes $250,000 on a home worth only $200,000 must pay the lender's
269. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Ban. v. Jaaskelainen, 407 B.R. 449, 460 (D. Mass. 2009);
Ramirez v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Ramirez), 329 B.R. 727, 742 (D. Kan. 2005); In
re Webster, 300 B.R. 787, 802 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2003).
271. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 236, 264-65.
272. Janskelainen, 407 B.R. at 461-62 (reversing the Massachusetts bankruptcy court's
decision that imposing conditional rescission is inappropriate in the bankruptcy context
because deviating from TILA's plain language and allowing the lender to retain its
secured interest would unfairly discriminate against general unsecured creditors); In re
Ramirez, 329 B.R. at 742 ("In this case, [by asking the court not to order conditional
rescission and instead to follow TILA's default rescission sequence,] the Ramirezes are
attempting to use an equitable remedy to create a legal right to effectively strip
Household's mortgage lien, a right they are not accorded under bankruptcy law.").
273. TABB, supra note 26, § 7.32, at 772; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
274. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).
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$250,000 claim in full. 275 Some courts reason that following TILA's
default rescission sequence, which relegates a formerly secured
mortgage lender to unsecured-creditor status, improperly circumvents
the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition on the modification of residential
mortgages.276
The following cases outline two Chapter 13 cases in which the
bankruptcy judges classified the borrowers' tender obligations
separately, as claims to be paid out in installments over an extended
period exceeding the length of their Chapter 13 plans (which last
between three and five years). These flexible approaches, like those
of the Hughes and Williams courts, are instructive to courts
adjudicating the rescission claims of underwater borrowers. However,
where tender obligations can be satisfied more easily than outside of
the bankruptcy context, encouraging underwater borrowers to file for
bankruptcy is an incomplete solution. Non-bankruptcy judges have
more latitude to fashion creative repayment plans than do bankruptcy
judges, who are constrained by the Bankruptcy Code itself.
b. Instructive Chapter 13 Cases
In Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor may satisfy the tender
requirement by treating it as an unsecured claim to be repaid on a pro
rata277  basis with other unsecured creditors through a debt
readjustment plan.278 While the borrowers in In re Bell79 and In re
275. Most believe that the prohibition on the modification of residential mortgages was
intended to prevent a reduction in the availability of home mortgage loans and the
tightening of the conditions required to obtain a mortgage loan. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Hous.
First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (1st Cir. 1984); Robert M. Zinman & Novica
Petrovski, The Home Mortgage and Chapter 13: An Essay on Unintended Consequences,
17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 136-38 (2009). But see Levitin, supra note 3, at 573 n.26
(noting that there is no conclusive evidence in the legislative history that the
antimodification provision was intended to preserve mortgage credit). Recent proposals to
nullify the prohibition on modifying home mortgages in bankruptcy have stalled. See S.
Amend. 1014 to Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, S. 896, 111th Cong.
(2009); Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, S. 895, 111th Cong. (2009);
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (2009).
276. See cases cited supra note 2702.
277. A creditor's claim paid on a "pro rata basis" is paid in the same proportion that
the claim bears to the aggregate amount of all claims in the same "class," or category. 2
THOMAS J. SALERNO & JORDAN A. KROOP, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION AND PRACTICE:
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE app. 1, at 19 (Supp. 2010-2011).
278. David P. Leibowitz, 2009 Survey of Residential Mortgage Issues in Consumer
Bankruptcy Cases, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 317, 329-32
(William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 2009).
279. Bell v. Parkway Mortg., Inc. (In re Bell) (Bell 1), 309 B.R. 139 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2004); Bell II, 314 B.R. 54 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004).
218 [Vol. 89
CONSUMERS' RIGHT OF RESCISSION
Sterten280 were not underwater, they, like underwater borrowers, were
experiencing financial hardship, limiting their ability to immediately
return their lenders to the status quo ante.
In In re Bell, the court found that the debtor was entitled to
rescission because the lender failed to provide the debtor with either
copy of the "Notice of Right to Cancel" at the loan closing.28 In a
later opinion, in response to the debtor's argument that she could not
repay the full tender amount over the remainder of her five-year
Chapter 13 plan, the court concluded that the debtor could establish a
"reasonable repayment schedule" that exceeded the duration of the
plan.282
In a subsequent hearing, the court ordered the borrower to repay
its tender obligation of $46,630 over fifteen years (the original loan
term) at 10.8% interest, the parties' original contract rate.283 The
court classified the borrower's repayment obligation as an unsecured
claim but lifted the stay to enable the lender to record this obligation
as a judgment in the real property records.28 Subsequently, the
parties agreed to a settlement: a loan modification that reduced the
interest rate to seven percent.285 In addition, the parties agreed that
the lender would retain its security interest in the borrower's home
during the repayment period.26
In In re Sterten, the bankruptcy court ordered conditional
rescission, allowing the creditor to retain its security interest until the
debtor fulfilled her tender obligation.2" In addition, the court allowed
the debtor to repay her tender obligation over the original mortgage
term of 302 months in monthly payments of $790, a figure "at the
upper end of what [the debtor] believe[d] she c[ould] afford." 2 8 This
monthly payment and loan term resulted in an interest rate of
6.36%.289
In making these determinations, the Sterten court recognized two
competing considerations-one that favored the debtor and one that
280. Sterten v. Option One Mortg. Corp. (In re Sterten), 352 B.R. 380 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2006).
281. Bell 1, 309 B.R. at 158.
282. Bell II, 314 B.R. at 62.
283. Bell II, No. 01-14420, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2004) (order).
284. Id. at 3.
285. Bell II, No. 01-14420, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 31, 2005) (order
confirming plan under chapter 13).
286. Id.
287. In re Sterten, 352 B.R. 380, 390 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
288. Id. at 390.
289. Id. at 390 n.16.
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favored the creditor. On the one hand, restructuring the mortgage
terms to maximize the likelihood that the debtor could successfully
tender in full (albeit over a "lengthy repayment period") was crucial
to preserving TILA's consumer-protective function.29 0 At the same
time, however, the lender's disclosure violation, although a
"material" error under TILA that triggered the borrower's right of
rescission, did not involve any "pervasive overreaching or
irregularities."29' Under this view, the lender's relatively minor
disclosure error should trigger a correspondingly mild penalty.
In an attempt to reconcile these competing considerations, the
bankruptcy court reached an appropriate compromise: it permitted
the lender to retain its security interest pending the debtor's
fulfillment of her repayment obligation, thereby helping to ensure
that the lender would be returned to the status quo ante (albeit over
an extended period of time) and would not suffer a forfeiture (in the
event of the debtor's default). 2' At the same time, the court allowed
the debtor to return the net loan proceeds to the lender in affordable
installments over the remaining loan term.293 The court recognized
that sustaining TILA as a viable enforcement tool required that the
court exercise flexibility in structuring affordable repayment terms.
These two opposing factors-(1) the need to preserve
consumers' ability to rescind as a means of enforcing the statute's
objectives and (2) concerns about imposing excessive liability on
creditors for de minimis violations-are present in the vast majority
of TILA rescission actions. Although TILA imposes liability on
creditors on a strict liability basis, it is not unreasonable for courts, in
crafting an equitable remedy, to be able to consider whether or not
the lender's disclosure error was intentional or in bad faith.
Nonetheless, it is crucial to preserve consumers' access to TILA's
rescission remedy, regardless of whether these consumers are
underwater or in bankruptcy, since ordinary citizens, through a
private cause of action under TILA, sustain an important public
policy objective: ensuring that creditors accurately and completely
disclose the cost of credit. The judges in In re Bell and In re Sterten
recognized that to preserve TILA's rescission remedy-complete
with its crucial deterrent functions and ability to help borrowers
discern the true cost of borrowing money-courts must consider
290. Id. at 389.
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allowing the borrower to tender in affordable installment payments.
In essence, the affordability or feasibility of borrowers' obligation to
return the lender to the status quo ante is crucial to preserving TILA's
rescission remedy in a depressed housing market.
One might argue that preserving consumers' access to rescission
in inability-to-tender cases can be accomplished most easily by
encouraging underwater borrowers to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
where a court, like those in In re Bell and In re Sterten, has substantial
expertise in helping the debtor structure a repayment plan,294
determining what interest rate to apply, and determining when a case
must be dismissed based on the infeasibility2 95 of the debtor's
proposed repayment schedule. Indeed, most TILA rescission
plaintiffs bring rescission actions defensively in response to
foreclosure actions,296 many of which may have been precipitated by a
job loss, separation or divorce, or illness that causes additional
irreparable financial strain. These plaintiffs might be good candidates
for bankruptcy. In addition, it seems logical to craft the most flexible
repayment options for inability-to-tender plaintiffs experiencing a
degree of financial hardship that forces them to invoke the protection
of the Bankruptcy Code.
While Chapter 13 bankruptcy judges should be more amenable
to allowing borrowers to repay their tender obligations over
installments that exceed the length of their three- to five-year plans,
encouraging underwater borrowers to bring their rescission claims in
bankruptcy is an incomplete solution. Although bankruptcy judges
have substantial expertise in crafting repayment plans, the
Bankruptcy Code itself has the potential to constrain judges' options.
Allowing debtors to tender in installments, for example, is vulnerable
to the argument that such an approach unlawfully circumvents
Congress's prohibition on the modification of mortgages on debtors'
principal residences.29 Moreover, particularly as the number of
foreclosures increases, pushing down the prices of neighboring
homes, borrowers who are underwater on their mortgages (and who
therefore are unable to tender in full and immediately) may grow
more distinguishable from the population of prototypical bankruptcy
debtors. The inability of borrowers to tender is a problem involving
issues broader than those of borrower insolvency. Homeowners'
294. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)-(f) (2006).
295. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2006).
296. See supra note 50.
297. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Jaaskelainen, 407 B.R. 449, 461-62 (D. Mass. 2009).
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inability to finance their tender obligations by tapping the wealth in
their homes is a more ubiquitous problem that both bankruptcy and
non-bankruptcy judges should be ready and willing to address.
While bankruptcy courts have the capacity to assist underwater
TILA plaintiffs with two statutory tools-TILA's rescission
provisions and the Bankruptcy Code-it is crucial that non-
bankruptcy judges provide borrowers with similarly broad access to
rescission. Because the vast majority of bankruptcy practitioners are
unfamiliar with consumer law claims and defenses under statutes like
TILA,298 the majority of rescission claims are adjudicated by non-
bankruptcy judges. Moreover, because most consumers bring
rescission actions defensively in response to foreclosure actions, state
court judges are likely to be the first arbiters of TILA claims. Thus,
while bankruptcy judges must be open to modifying underwater
borrowers' repayment obligations to sustain TILA's broader policy
objectives, non-bankruptcy judges, who resolve a larger percentage of
TILA rescission claims, have the capacity to advance these goals
more expansively.
III. WHY INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS MAKE SENSE
This Part explores why allowing borrowers to tender in
installments is superior to courts' dominant approach of denying
rescission relief to borrowers who are unable to tender in full and
immediately. Installment payments are consistent with the language
of the statute and its consumer-protective purposes. This proposal,
moreover, sustains and enhances the relatively small amount of
leverage consumers possess in a largely inhospitable legal and
economic climate.
A. Weighing the Equities
Although TILA rescission varies considerably from its common
law cousin,299 courts have concluded that, in one respect, TILA
rescission and common law rescission are coterminous: both attempt
to return the parties to the status quo ante.
When borrowers are underwater and unable to tender either
through a refinancing or a sale of the home, they are incapable of
restoring the lender to its pre-mortgage loan transaction position.
Although some consumer speculators gambled on real estate before
298. Telephone Interview with David P. Leibowitz, supra note 50.
299. See supra Part IB.1.
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the housing bubble burst, 3 ' dramatic regional and national declines in
home prices are attributable to various factors3 01 for which the vast
majority of borrowers bear little responsibility. In this context,
imposing on lenders (those who violated TILA) or their assignees
(those who purchased defective mortgages from TILA violators) the
cost of a gradual return to the status quo ante through installment
payments is preferable to depriving a significant percentage of the
population of TILA's protections. Creditors have the ability to ensure
not only that disclosures are accurate, but also that borrowers receive
suitable mortgages that, based on a thorough inquiry into the
borrowers' current income and credit history, borrowers can afford.
Creditors are the least-cost avoiders of disclosure violations and the
first line of defense against mortgage complications that trigger
rescission actions.
While one might argue that this approach imposes too significant
of a penalty on creditors, it is important to remember that Congress
specifically fashioned a very strict mechanism to enforce TILA's
disclosure requirements.30 2  TILA substantially relaxes the
requirements for seeking relief under the common law303 and imposes
liability on lenders on a strict liability basis30 in order to encourage
lenders to disclose the key terms of mortgage loan transactions
clearly, consistently, and completely. By providing a private right of
action with a severe remedy like rescission, TILA encourages
consumers, serving as "private attorneys general," to police the
marketplace.30 s Allowing consumers to tender in installments is not a
draconian reformulation of the rescission remedy; it is a more modest
change necessary to preserve a long-standing and exacting remedy in
danger of growing defunct in an idiosyncratic housing market.
One rescission provision suggests that, in certain cases, Congress
was not interested in hewing too closely to a strict requirement of
returning the parties to the status quo ante if doing so would elevate
form over function and deny otherwise eligible borrowers access to
300. See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009).
301. See generally Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009) (listing, inter alia, low-documentation
loans, inflated house appraisals, and teaser rates as causes of the subprime meltdown).
302. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part I.B.1.
304. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
305. Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 673 F.2d 1178, 1181 (11th Cir. 1982); Ratner
v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (D.C.N.Y. 1971); Murken,
supra note 148, at 461 (citations omitted).
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the rescission remedy altogether. In section 1635(b), TILA provides
that "if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or
inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value."o 6 Some
commentators have concluded that this provision applies to
consumers' tender obligations in the home improvement credit sale
context, in which a borrower enters into a contract for the purchase
and installation of home improvement materials (e.g., aluminum
siding)." In a home improvement credit sale, the creditor does not
take out a mortgage on the borrower's home. TILA nevertheless
requires the contractor to provide borrowers with a "Notice of Right
to Cancel," since a borrower's failure to pay all or a portion of the
contract price may trigger the placement of a lien on the borrower's
home.3 0s Just as in the mortgage refinancing context, a creditor's
failure to completely and accurately disclose the borrower's right to
cancel the transaction during the three-day "cooling-off period" can
extend TILA's rescission period to up to three years.3 09
Generally, in returning her creditor to the status quo ante, a
borrower must tender whatever specific proceeds-whether money or
property-the creditor provided to the borrower under the parties'
contractual relationship."o Thus, when a borrower in the home
improvement credit sale context exercises her right to rescind, she
must return to the contractor the home improvement materials she
purchased. Recognizing that a strict return to the status quo ante
would be "impracticable or inequitable" after, for example, certain
materials have been affixed to the borrower's home, Congress
permits such a borrower to return to the creditor the property's
"reasonable value."311 Indeed, even under the common law, courts
can exercise some creativity and flexibility in fashioning the
mechanics of the rescission process.312
306. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006).
307. See, e.g., ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 82, 1 8.02[1][a], at 605.
308. See, e.g., Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243,251 (6th Cir. 1980) (explaining
that a creditor is required to disclose the mere contingency of a mechanic's lien being
placed on the home).
309. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
310. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
311. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).
312. Traditionally, under the common law, a plaintiff unable to return to the defendant
precisely what she obtained in the original transaction would be denied the opportunity to
rescind. Today, however, courts can fashion more creative solutions. For example, a court
can allow a plaintiff attempting to rescind a purchase of property that has subsequently
depreciated to restore the seller by tendering a combination of property and money. 1
DOBBS, supra note 100, § 4.3(6), at 614, § 4.4, at 626-27. As Dobbs has explained:
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This provision might not apply in the prototypical rescindable
transaction313 : a mortgage loan refinancing in which the creditor
supplies the borrower with money-not property. This language does
suggest, however, that Congress might have favored a pragmatic
approach when a precise return to the status quo ante is either
impossible or very difficult, particularly when the alternative would
wholly deny TILA's protections to a class of borrowers.
Not unlike this home improvement credit sale example, requiring
underwater borrowers to tender in full and immediately or risk
dismissal of their rescission claims would be both "impracticable" and
"inequitable." When an innocent borrower's housing value declines
unforeseeably, cleaving to a strict requirement that the borrower
return her creditor immediately to the status quo ante undermines
TILA's ability to protect a substantial percentage of American
homeowners.
Courts, moreover, through conditional rescission, have been
willing to use their equitable authority to protect lenders from
partially or completely losing the benefit of their bargains.314 In
crafting TILA's rescission provisions, Congress reversed the sequence
of events necessary to effectuate a rescission under common law.315
Under the common law, a borrower must tender first. Until she does
so, the rescission remedy is unavailable. By reversing this sequence
and requiring lenders to invalidate their security interests in
borrowers' homes shortly after receiving a borrower's rescission
notice, Congress shifted significant leverage to consumers. By later
A rescission is an avoidance of a transaction. Rescission will normally be
accompanied by restitution on both sides.
Restitution like other remedies must make the best of a bad situation.
Adjustments that combine restitution in specie with restitution in money, or even
combine restitution and damages, are more flexible and can be more attuned to
the equities of the particular case. Legal thinking today permits judges to be
attuned to forming remedies that are responsive to the case .... At least in some
cases of wrongful conduct by the defendant, it may be that the plaintiff should be
permitted to make restitution that is not in specie or that is not fully so.
Id.
313. See, e.g., ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 82, 8.01[1], at 597-98. Some
practitioners, however, have cited this provision in arguments that returning the property
(the home) to the creditor satisfies the tender requirement. THOMPSON & RENUART,
supra note 28, § 6.8.2, at 294.
314. See supra Part I.B.2.
315. See supra Part 1.B.1.
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reinstating the common law sequence of events, courts put creditors
back in the driver's seat.
This Article does not discuss in detail the propriety of
conditional rescission. Those arguments have been explored
elsewhere.3 16 It is crucial to observe, however, that courts have "flexed
their equitable muscles"317 in retooling TILA's rescission provisions
to preserve creditors' rights. Courts concluded that, without
reshuffling the sequence of the steps in the rescission process, a
forfeiture would occur: lenders would release their security interests
in borrowers' homes, and some would be repaid only in part or, on
occasion, not at all."'
A similar forfeiture is now occurring in today's depressed
housing market. If courts do not consider allowing borrowers to
tender in installments, courts risk limiting TILA's extended rescission
rights to a decreasing pool of privileged borrowers-those who can
afford to tender from available funds or those with sufficient equity in
their homes to finance their tender obligations through a refinancing
or sale. This sacrifice can be averted if courts allow borrowers to
tender in installments.
B. A Gradual Return to the Status Quo Ante
Allowing borrowers to tender in installments is consistent with
both TILA's consumer-protective purpose and its plain language.
TILA provides that creditors must tender within twenty days after
receiving the borrower's rescission notice. 19 Congress imposed no
such time limit for borrowers.320 In interpreting this provision, courts
have concluded that borrowers, therefore, must tender within a
"reasonable time."321 In a depressed housing market-one in which
borrowers, through no fault of their own, are unable to tender in full
and immediately-allowing borrowers to tender in installments
supplies the "reasonable time" necessary to prevent TILA's rescission
remedy from being rendered obsolete for a significant number of
borrowers.
316. See sources cited supra note 148.
317. Murken, supra note 148, at 465.
318. See, e.g., Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980).
319. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006).
320. See id.
321. See, e.g., In re Sterten, 352 B.R. 380, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
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C. Preserving Rescission As a Significant Source of Borrower
Leverage
Courts' willingness to circumscribe rescission-both by ordering
conditional rescission and generally refusing to allow borrowers to
tender in installments-may be in part attributable to persistent
criticisms frequently leveled against TILA's rescission provisions.322
This section considers these common critiques. It concludes that
TILA, albeit sometimes an imprecise or indirect means of protecting
consumers, must be preserved for two primary reasons. First,
although, as many have argued, disclosure-based regulation is an
imperfect means of protecting consumers, and TILA disclosures must
be improved,3 23 rescission reinforces Congress's original intent in
passing TILA: facilitating the disclosure of accurate and consistent
information about the cost of credit. Second, TILA's rescission
provisions promote a more subtle objective: providing consumers
with a meaningful source of leverage in a predominantly inhospitable
legal and economic environment.
The elements a plaintiff must establish to rescind a contract
under a common law claim of fraudulent misrepresentation contrast
sharply with the elements a plaintiff must establish to rescind a loan
transaction under TILA.3 24 As a result, the link between the event
giving rise to the plaintiff's right of rescission (the lender's disclosure
violation) and the harm suffered by the plaintiff (her precise impetus
to sue) is necessarily attenuated in some rescission cases.
Courts have observed this disconnect, and many may be more
likely to order conditional rescission or reject a plaintiff's request to
tender in installments for this reason. Some courts appear to perceive
rescission as a draconian punishment for seemingly harmless or
"technical" disclosure errors.325 An argument that TILA's rescission
322. See, e.g., Carrillo & Kofoed, supra note 92, at 5 (describing how creditors, in
urging courts to apply conditional rescission, frequently raise protestations about
"improvident consumer spending, the (mis)use of rescission to palliate economic woes
caused by consumer overspending, judicial disregard for the realities of mortgage lending,
and ... the current volatility of the nation's economy").
323. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 54, at 139; Renuart & Thompson, supra note 7, at 190
(arguing that the Federal Reserve Board should revise TILA's definition of "finance
charge" to make it a more inclusive and, therefore, more accurate reflection of the cost of
credit); Sovern, supra note 54 (suggesting that TILA's disclosure regime should be
replaced with a "comprehension regime" under which lenders would be required to insure
that borrowers understand their loan terms).
324. See supra Part I.B.1.
325. See, e.g., King v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (D. Mass. 2009)
(explaining how the more rigorous test applied in the First Circuit is consistent with
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remedy imposes excessive liability on creditors helped sway three
circuits to deny members of TILA class actions access to rescission.3 26
Courts remain willing to order conditional rescission for "non-
egregious" violations, and, presumably, courts might refuse to allow
borrowers to tender in installments for the same reason.
While the disclosure violations that trigger rescission at first
glance may appear inconsequential, rescission is triggered by errors in
only a handful of the many categories of information that TILA
requires creditors to disclose to borrowers.327 Under TILA, "material
disclosures" include the APR, the method of determining the finance
charge and the balance upon which a finance charge will be imposed,
the amount of the finance charge, the amount to be financed, the total
of payments, the number and amount of payments, and the due dates
or periods of payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness.3 28 This
information is essential to a borrower's intelligent assessment of
whether or not a particular loan is a suitable economic transaction.
Some courts, moreover, appear more hesitant to allow borrowers
to seek rescission on the eve of foreclosure sales. These courts might
interpret the rescission action as an opportunistic and evasive
maneuver, rather than as an honest attempt to unwind a mortgage
transaction entered into with incomplete or inaccurate information.
Several courts, for example, have expressed that rescission is not
intended to allow borrowers to reform their mortgages to obtain a
"better deal" than the borrowers initially bargained for.329 Indeed,
under the common law, a consumer who waits longer than a
"reasonable time" after the initial transaction may be estopped from
seeking rescission.330
Undoubtedly, the statute does allow some plaintiffs to sue
opportunistically. Some plaintiffs who have suffered a de minimis
TILA violation can bring a rescission action to escape from a bad
mortgage-one with onerous terms, or one that the plaintiff simply
Congress's 1995 amendments to TILA, which attempted to prevent creditors from facing
"draconian" liability for relatively minor errors).
326. See, e.g., McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 427 (1st Cir.
2007) (interpreting Congress's 1995 amendments to TILA as a "manifest intent to shield
residential lenders from crushing liability"). See generally Carrillo & Kofoed, supra note
92 (analyzing whether consumers can seek a class-action rescission under TILA).
327. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (2006); Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Renuart,
Assistant Professor, Albany Law Sch. (Jan. 14, 2010).
328. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(u).
329. See, e.g., Am. Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 820 (4th Cir. 2007).
330. See sources cited supra note 99.
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can no longer afford as a result of an intervening job loss, a divorce or
separation, or illness.
Any statute that provides broad and meaningful consumer
protection, however, will have some unintended beneficiaries. It is
inappropriate to rebuke a plaintiff who has established a disclosure
error for "abusing" TILA, a statute that provides borrowers, the
"private attorneys general" who enforce the statute, with a strict-
liability remedy. In TILA's rescission provisions, Congress relaxed
the requirements a borrower must satisfy to seek rescission for
fraudulent misrepresentation under the common law.33' Congress
thereby necessarily and predictably deemphasized borrowers'
motivations for bringing a rescission action and simultaneously
accentuated the importance of lenders' compliance with TILA's
disclosure rules.
Moreover, the frequent "off-label" use of TILA's rescission
provisions-borrowers' attempts to seek rescission primarily to save
their homes from foreclosure 332 -mUst not dissuade courts from
providing underwater plaintiffs full relief under TILA's rescission
provisions. This use of TILA by consumers must not be
conceptualized as abuse or as indulgent opportunism, but as a
legitimate attempt to alleviate financial strain in a legal environment
generally lacking in substantive protections for consumers. 3 3 To the
extent that TILA, primarily a disclosure statute, has produced a large
class of "accidental" plaintiffs who seek relief from onerous mortgage
terms, legislators can consider whether a more targeted solution to
consumers' mortgage distress is appropriate. In the meantime,
however, TILA's rescission provisions should be preserved as a stop-
gap measure of protection in the marketplace, which provides
consumers with little substantive relief. Currently, consumers,
particularly overleveraged consumers, have precious few safeguards
in the marketplace. Common law remedies are insufficient to protect
borrowers from lender overreaching. 33' Deregulation of usury laws
331. See supra Part I.B.1.
332. See Telephone Interview with David P. Leibowitz, supra note 50.
333. Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26
YALE J. ON REG. 143, 148-63 (2009).
334. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (2005) (explaining the difficulty of
suing predatory lenders under a common law fraud theory).
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has rendered any price for credit legal.33 5 The lack of an across-the-
board prohibition on harmful loan terms, including prepayment
penalties and teaser rates, has incentivized brokers and lenders to
match consumers with unsuitable mortgage products. In bankruptcy,
consumers are unable to modify mortgages on their principal
residences.336 In spite of financial incentives subsidized by taxpayer
dollars, servicers are frequently unable and/or unwilling to modify
homeowners' mortgages. 337
Lawyers representing clients in rescission actions acknowledge
that TILA's rescission provisions are a blunt instrument, one
providing "rough justice" 3 38 to consumers whose mortgages may
suffer from a range of defects, including material TILA disclosure
errors.339 One attorney describes rescission as an "Al Capone" 340
claim, a means of seeking justice for consumers for TILA violations
committed by lenders who may be guilty of various other
transgressions that may or may not be actionable.341 A TILA
rescission claim, albeit more mundane than other causes of action, is
more "user-friendly"342 to rescission plaintiffs.
To some, allowing borrowers to tender in installments to
preserve TILA's rescission remedy and to facilitate the delivery of
"rough justice" might appear unsatisfactorily imprecise. Undeniably,
legislators should pursue targeted solutions to vulnerabilities in the
country's consumer-protection edifice. Congress, for example, has
abandoned promising long-term solutions to the housing crisis in
response to powerful lobbying campaigns by the financial industry.343
335. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 1.1, at 1
(4th ed. 2009).
336. See sources cited supra note 3.
337. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 51.
338. Telephone Interview with Diane Thompson, Of Counsel, Nat'1 Consumer Law
Ctr. (Jan. 22, 2010).
339. Id.
340. Telephone Interview with Daniel Lindsey, supra note 202. Al Capone was an
infamous American gangster who was successfully prosecuted for income tax evasion. His
trial and those of his top associates "made it clear to federal agents and criminals alike that
people whom state governments would or could not prosecute for murder, extortion, and
other serious crimes could be sent to jail by the national government for violation of the
income tax laws." RON CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL TRIALS IN HISTORY: FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 56 (1991).
341. Telephone Interview with Daniel Lindsey, supra note 202.
342. See FISCHER, supra note 99, at 528.
343. See, e.g., Margaret Chadbourn, Senate Mortgage 'Cram-Down' Bill Headed to
Defeat as Banks Balk, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJ-sqd73POWk&refer=us.
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Although the Dodd-Frank Act3 " and the nascent Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection may help provide relief to consumers,
meaningful improvements to laws benefitting homeowners appear
elusive.
Thus, for the moment, TILA remains one of the only significant
sources of consumer leverage in the loan modification setting.345
Significantly, allowing underwater borrowers to tender in
installments-the effective equivalent of a mortgage modification-
would benefit consumers, lenders, and communities alike. Borrowers
frequently seek rescission in a last-ditch attempt to avoid foreclosure.
If these borrowers are granted access to rescission in spite of their
inability to tender in full and immediately, they are less likely to
"strategically default" by walking away from their mortgages
altogether. Averting foreclosures prevents familial instability, limits
lenders' financial losses, and protects communities from further
degradation in home values, from dilution of their property tax base,
and from the blight associated with empty homes.346
CONCLUSION
The right of rescission under TILA is a remedy that helps deter
lender overreaching and fraud during one of the most complex
financial transactions of a borrower's lifetime. The depressed housing
market, however, has substantially impaired many borrowers' ability
to fulfill their responsibilities in the unwinding process: restoring the
344. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
345. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
346. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 28, at 34; see also Phillip Lovell & Julia
Isaacs, The Impact of the Mortgage Crisis on Children and Their Education, FIRST Focus,
Apr. 2008, at 1-2, available at http://www.brookings.edul-/media/Files/rc/papers/2008
/04_mortgage_crisis isaacs/04_mortgagecrisis-isaacs.pdf ("Over the next 2 years, an
estimated 2 million children will be directly impacted by the mortgage crisis as their
families lose their homes due to foreclosures. These children are not just losing their
homes, but they also risk losing their friends, schools, and in many ways, their
childhood."); John Y. Campbell et al., Forced Sales and House Prices, MIT DEP'T OF
ECON., 20-21 (Dec. 2009), http://econ-www.mit.edulfiles/3914 (concluding that, on
average, a foreclosure reduces the value of a home by twenty-seven percent and that
homes within 264 feet of a foreclosed home decline in value by one percent);
Neighborhood Stabilization Program Grants, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/community development/programs/neighborhoodspg (last
updated Sept. 8, 2010) (describing federal grants available to states, local governments,
and nonprofit organizations to stabilize and rehabilitate foreclosure-ravaged
communities).
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lender to the status quo ante by repaying the net loan proceeds of the
mortgage transaction.
Under courts' dominant approach, when borrowers are unable to
tender in full and immediately or within a short time, the consumer-
protective functions of rescission-and the remedy's deterrent role-
are undermined. In the western United States, most courts, citing the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Yamamoto, dismiss inability-to-tender cases
at the pleading stage. If borrowers are unable to establish at the
outset of the case an ability to tender, these courts, in reliance on
Yamamoto, prematurely dispose of cases with potentially viable
rescission claims. As a result, lenders defending rescission claims in
courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely file motions to dismiss in the
hopes that the plaintiffs will be unable to establish an ability to repay
the net loan proceeds of the mortgage transaction. For this reason,
practitioners in the western United States turn away borrowers who
are substantially underwater on their mortgages and therefore unable
to finance their tender obligations in full and immediately, regardless
of the strength of their rescission claims-and the severity of the
lenders' disclosure errors.
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, courts generally fully adjudicate
borrowers' rescission claims, but, because courts around the country
routinely order conditional rescission, borrowers outside the Ninth
Circuit fare only slightly better than their counterparts. When courts
order conditional rescission, they reinstate the common law sequence
of events necessary to effectuate the unwinding process: borrowers
must restore their lenders to the status quo ante by repaying the net
loan proceeds before courts will require lenders to invalidate their
security interests in borrowers' homes. Lenders, conscious of
ballooning litigation expenses, are more likely to settle cases outside
of the Ninth Circuit. Underwater borrowers with lenders who refuse
to settle, however, are ultimately denied rescission relief unless and
until these borrowers restore their lenders to the status quo ante.
There is a better way. Courts can allow underwater borrowers to
restore lenders to the status quo ante over time-through an
installment plan that resembles a mortgage modification (and under
which borrowers would be required to pay a reasonable rate of
interest). This approach is consistent with TILA's plain language and
its consumer-protective functions and origins. Allowing borrowers to
tender in installments, moreover, is essential even when borrowers
bring TILA rescission actions in response to foreclosure actions that
the lenders' disclosure violations may or may not have precipitated.
The ability of borrowers to raise TILA claims even for "off-label"
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purposes is consistent with the operation of a strict liability remedy.
In addition, TILA rescission claims must remain available even to
underwater borrowers, since the remedy shifts substantial leverage to
consumers in a legal and economic climate lacking in meaningful
substantive protections. Using TILA to facilitate a form of "rough
justice" may be criticized as imprecise and overbroad. Ensuring that
TILA rescission remains accessible to all borrowers in spite of
vicissitudes in the housing market, however, is a crucial stop-gap
measure consistent with a statute whose disclosure rules-and whose
viability-depend on private enforcement by its consumer
beneficiaries.
